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Factors and Outcomes Associated with Patterns of Child Support Arrears  
Hyunjoon Um 
The term “deadbeat dad” has been used to refer to nonresident fathers who intentionally 
avoid meeting child support obligations. Such a stereotypical image has reinforced the notion 
that public policy should strengthen the child support enforcement system to prevent nonresident 
fathers from escaping their financial obligations to their children.  Public pressure, along with the 
need to recoup government expenditures on welfare costs, has compelled the federal and state 
governments to build a strong child support enforcement program during the past decades. 
Although many empirical researchers have found that strict child support enforcement is 
responsible for an increase in child support payments received through a formal system, the 
extent of non-payments still remains high. Arrears, defined as unpaid child support either owed 
to custodial families or the government, grew to over $115 billion nationally. Although the 
Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) collected and distributed approximately $7 billion 
of these arrears in 2016, 11.3 million child support cases still had arrears remaining.  
Despite the growing problem of child support arrears, relatively little research has been 
carried out on the long-term factors and outcomes associated with arrears accumulation. This is 
because prior studies of child support arrears rely on cross-sectional data, which cannot 
adequately address this research gap. What is more, in regarding information on child support 
outcomes, many previous child-support studies rely predominantly on maternal reports rather 
than on information obtained directly from the noncustodial fathers, which may introduce 
measurement errors. The proposed study will solve this problem by using data from Fragile 
Families and Child Well-Being Study, a longitudinal survey of 4,898 children born to married 
and unmarried parents in the major cities in the U.S. between 1998 and 2000. Because the data 
 
 
are the first and only longitudinal information providing a nationally representative sample of 
unmarried fathers, it is eminently suited to address the limitation of prior research.  
The objective of the proposed three-paper dissertation is to address gaps in the literature 
by exploring the following three questions. 
 
Question 1. What are the effects of state-level child support enforcement policies on long-
term individual patterns of arrears accumulations among noncustodial fathers?  
Strong child-support enforcement is responsible for noncustodial father’s child support 
arrears accumulation. However, little is known about the extent to which child support policies 
affect noncustodial fathers’ long-term patterns of arrears accumulation. Studying the long-term 
patterns of arrears accumulation is potentially important, especially for policy makers who would 
be better able to make informed decisions about the timing of policy intervention. This chapter 
will examine the long-term impact of child support policies that penalize a father who had failed 
to comply with child support obligations on his arrears accumulation patterns. 
 
 Question 2. What is the association between arrears and fathers’ later health/mental 
health outcomes? 
The next chapter of the study will discuss one of the detrimental consequences of child 
support arrears: fathers’ health and mental health problems. While several notable qualitative 
studies have provided anecdotes about challenges that the noncustodial fathers face after the 
accumulation of child support arrears, only one quantitative study examined the association 
between the fathers’ arrears and their health and mental health problems. The proposed study 
 
 
will address these gaps in knowledge by using the stress process model proposed by Pearlin and 
colleagues. 
 
Question 3. How child support indebtedness matter for residential union formation 
among non-resident couples at childbirth? 
How money matters for union transitions among low-income unmarried parents have 
been of great interest to policy makers given the extensive evidence that marriage (or 
cohabitation) is associated with lower rates of child poverty. Child support enforcement is the 
tool intended to mitigate financial loss experienced by children. The system simply collects 
money from the noncustodial parent (usually fathers) and distributes it to the custodial parent 
(usually mothers). Therefore, the child support system is highly linked to union transitions 
decisions among parents who are either recipients or obligors of child support. Despite extensive 
empirical studies on this topic, limited research has been aimed at understanding the adverse 
consequences of child support enforcement and its impact on union formation. That is, rather 
than successfully collecting money from noncustodial fathers, some governments’ efforts could 
be failed to make many low-income fathers comply with their obligations, resulting in a decline 
in the amount of child support received by custodial mothers. Thus, this chapter will investigate 
whether fathers’ arrears accumulation affects transitions to residential unions among parents not 
living in such unions at childbirth. In this chapter, parents who did not cohabit at birth, but who 
subsequently formed residential unions with one another or with a new partner are modeled as 
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   Chapter 1. 
The Effects of State-level Child Support Enforcement on Long-term Patterns of Arrears 













The goal of the child support program is to make sure that children receive financial 
support from both parents, to compel both parents to remain involved in children’s lives, and to 
reduce welfare costs. Another responsibility of the program is to collect accrued child support 
payments owed either to custodial families or to the government. When the custodial family 
receives public assistance, the custodial parent is required to cede their right to child support 
payments to the state under Federal law. If the noncustodial parent does not comply with the 
obligation, then the delinquent child support will be treated as a debt owed to the government. As 
of November 2013, a quarter of all arrears were owed to the government, a number that dropped 
from 51 percent in November 2002 (Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2014).  
Delinquent payments of child support are detrimental in many respects. If the arrears are 
owed to custodial families, children may receive less support than needed. A substantial research 
literature shows that children with limited financial resources are at risk of adverse outcomes 
including academic failure (Dahl & Lochner, 2005), and behavioral and cognitive problems 
(Aughinbaugh & Gittleman, 2003; Blau, 1999; Yeung, Linver, & Brooks–Gunn, 2002). If the 
arrears are owed to the government, delinquency in the payment of child support debt negatively 
affects the money the state collects, further burdening taxpayers.  
In addition, an arrears debt may be problematic in and of itself. Noncustodial fathers with 
high arrears can lose hope of ever repaying the amount owed  (Waller & Plotnick, 2001) and are 
more likely to avoid working in the formal labor market than those fathers with no arrears burden 
(Bartfeld & Meyer, 2003; D. P. Miller & Mincy, 2012). The fathers may also be subject to 
punitive enforcement actions, such as tax refund intercepts, asset seizure, driver’s license 





result, can aggravate the arrears problems (Holzer, Offner, & Sorensen, 2005; Sorensen, Sousa, 
& Schaner, 2007; Turetsky, 2007). Moreover, mothers with a large amount of uncollected child 
support debts owed by noncustodial fathers may not allow their child to visit with those fathers 
(Turner & Waller, 2017).  
In response to these problems, policymakers have enacted a range of child support 
policies intended to close gaps between the incomes available to children in single and two 
parent families, however, many policy measures have contributed to the growth in arrears 
(Bartfeld, 2003; Sorensen et al., 2007; Sorensen & Turner, 1997). In addition, the distribution of 
arrears is highly skewed toward low-income fathers, suggesting that fathers’ ability to pay could 
be responsible for the growth in arrears (Kim, Cancian, & Meyer, 2015; Sorensen et al., 2007).  
Despite a growing body of research on the accumulation of child support arrears, little is 
known about the extent to which the state and individual-level factors contribute to noncustodial 
father’s long-term patterns of arrears accumulations (Bartfeld, 2003; Heinrich, Burkhardt, & 
Shager, 2011; Pearson & Davis, 2002; Roberts, 2001; Sorensen, 2004; Sorensen, Koball, 
Pomper, & Zibman, 2003; Sorensen et al., 2007). Much of the previous research relies on a 
cross-sectional data set, which is limited to one period, therefore, it may be unable to distinguish 
between two noncustodial fathers who have accumulated the same amount of arrears but over 
different amounts of time (Kim et al., 2015). If policymakers can predict which of those two 
fathers would accumulate arrears more rapidly over the next several years, then they can allocate 
their resources more effectively to avoid further accumulation of arrears (Bartfeld, 2003; 
Heinrich et al., 2011; Roberts, 2001; Sorensen et al., 2007).  
A study conducted by Kim, Cancian, and Meyer (2015) is the only previous literature that 





the Wisconsin administrative data system, Kim and colleagues (2015) identified six idiosyncratic 
patterns of arrear accumulations among noncustodial fathers who established their first child 
support order in 2000. The study found that almost half the fathers in their sample never 
accumulated a substantial amount of arrears over the 11 years. In addition, once arrears were 
accumulated, it appears that one-fifth of the cases with increased at a slow pace, while the 
remainder showed a rapid increase at a certain point in time (Kim et al., 2015). 
Although Kim and colleague (2015) offered an informative picture of the patterns of 
arrears growth, they did not provide any insight into what factors make each trajectory group 
distinct from the others. Moreover, the data they used was not nationally representative, which 
inevitably called into question whether the results would be generalizable to people in other 
states. Lastly, they have not investigated the outcomes for nonresident fathers during childbirth 
who are less likely than resident parents to comply with child support obligations. To overcome 
these shortcomings, the proposed study will draw on data from the Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing Study (FFCWS), a longitudinal birth cohort study designed to explore a 
comprehensive understanding of unmarried parents and their children. The objective of this first 
chapter is to inform state and local OCSE managers and policymakers about the several factors 
associated with the long-term growth in arrears.   
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
There are no direct theoretical studies available to predict the accumulation patterns of 
child support arrears among noncustodial fathers. Nevertheless, the study of child support 
compliance may be consistent with the context in which the fathers are delinquent in paying off 
their child support debts (Kim et al., 2015). This study uses Beller and Graham’s (1996) 





theory of the consumer to help identify the factors associated with the child support payments of 
noncustodial fathers. They find that compliance (or payments) with child support obligations by 
noncustodial fathers depends on three determinants, including the child support enforcement, the 
father’s ability to pay, and the father’s willingness to pay.  
Child Support Enforcement and Arrears Accumulation 
The Federal government has enacted several child support laws ranging from automatic 
wage garnishment to intercepting federal tax refunds to collect delinquent payments. Although 
every state has already adopted most of these laws, there is still variation in child support 
enforcement practices amongst states because the enforcement is a state-run entity (Sorensen et 
al., 2007). A large body of research indicates that accumulation of arrears is, in part, the result of 
state-level enforcement policies (Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2014; Sorensen, 2004; 
Sorensen et al., 2003, 2007). According to a report from the Institute for Research on Poverty 
(Bartfeld, 2003), nearly 50 percent of total debts were attributable to the following four state-
level policies: interest on arrears, retroactive support orders, lying-in costs, and, other fees. The 
interest on arrears is a penalty charged on past-due child support payments. A certain 
assessment of interest may contribute to a large arrears balance. In the nine-state study about 
child support arrears, Sorensen and colleagues (2007) showed that states that assessed interest on 
a routine basis had a higher arrear growth rate than other states between the 1990s and 2000s.  
The retroactive support order is an obligation that covers the period prior to establishing a child 
support order. This order usually does not include the direct support given to children before the 
order was established (Sorensen, 1997b; Sorensen & Turner, 1997; Waller & Plotnick, 2001). 
The retroactive order is a crucial factor contributing to arrears growth for some states, including 





Therefore, noncustodial parents who are required to pay child support prior to the establishment 
of the current order are less likely to comply with their obligations. Lastly, lying-in costs usually 
refer to the reimbursement for Medicaid costs associated with the birth of the child, and other 
fees refer to any charges associated with paternity establishment, including genetic testing, court, 
and attorney fees.  
The accumulation of arrears depends on the length of time the fathers remain in the child 
support system, which can be defined as a case-length effect. As mentioned by Bartfeld (2003) 
and the U.S. Department of Health and Service (2000), the four state-level policies mentioned 
above will directly cause an increase in arrears over time after the establishment of the child 
support order. This suggests that the longer the father stays in the child support system, the more 
likely he is to accumulate child support arrears. According to this view, this study posits the 
following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Nonresident fathers who have been in the child support system for a long time 
may have a high level of child support arrears.  
 
The case-length effect may vary depending upon the efficiency of the enforcement 
system designed to collect accrued child support payments. A long literature has sought to 
investigate various aspects of how the ineffectiveness of the child support system is responsible 
for arrears accumulation. For instance, child support agencies’ limited ability to modify support 
orders would lead to the accumulation of greater arrears when a noncustodial parent’s income 
declines (Ha, Cancian, & Meyer, 2010; Johnson, Levine, & Doolittle, 1999). Furthermore, some 
states establish child support orders based on noncustodial parents’ “imputed income”, which 





U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000). 1 The Office of Inspection General 
(2000) found that a larger percentage of IV-D cases with order amounts established using 
imputed income exhibited lower compliance than cases with orders using non-imputed income.   
To promote the efficiency of child support enforcement, Congress enacted the Child 
Support Performance and Incentive Act (CSPIA) of 19982 (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2011) and rewarded states that perform well based on the National Child Support Goals 
measured by a number of achievements, including: arrearage collection, paternity establishment, 
order establishment, current collection, and cost-effectiveness (Solomon-Fears, 2013). More 
specifically, thirty-three percent of annual administrative expenditure, or $500 million,3 are given 
to the states that have achieved high levels of performances in those goals (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2011).  
To compete for the incentives, state and local governments had to develop a number of 
strategies to improve the collection of delinquent child support obligations. One strategy is to 
prevent further accumulation of arrears. Another strategy is to reduce existing arrears (Bartfeld & 
Meyer, 2003; Heinrich et al., 2011; Sorensen et al., 2007). The preventive strategy includes: 
establishing realistic child support orders and ease the process for applying for and obtaining a 
modification, reducing lying-in costs and interest rates charged on arrears, and eliminating 
retroactive orders. Given the substantial amount of arrears that have already accrued, debt 
reduction policies, such as the debt compromise program, are the favored arrears reduction 
strategy being introduced by many states and counties (U. S. Department of Health and Human 
                                                          
1 The income is imputed based on the noncustodial parents’ most recent work history. For low-income 
men, however, the imputed income usually overestimate the actual income because of their labor market 
instability (Turetsky, 2000). 
2 Pub. L. No. 105-200, 112 Stat. 645 (1998) 
3 The fund was adjusted to inflation rate, and the amount of which was increased to 504 million in 





Services, 2007). The underlying philosophy for debt compromise programs is to use state 
resources to help noncustodial parents pay off child support debts. As of September 2018, 45 
states were operating such programs, each of which has its own requirements for eligibility 
(Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2019). Each of the programs is expected to increase 
collections on child support debt from noncustodial parents without hurting their financial 
stability (Heinrich et al., 2011). 
In sum, a vast majority of past studies have shown that the accumulation of child support 
arrears can vary depending on the degree of child support enforcement. Therefore, we can easily 
assume that compared to nonresident fathers who lived in states with more effective child 
support enforcement policies, those fathers living in the state with less effective enforcement 
policies will accumulate more child support debts. However, no study has investigated whether 
the efficiency effect may operate through the case-length effect. It seems plausible that fathers 
who respond to the effective child support system may be the one who has accumulated high 
arrears due to being in the child support system for a long time. On the contrary, fathers who 
have recently established child support orders may not be responsive to the efficiency of the 
enforcement system because their arrears amounts are not large enough to be eligible for debt 
reduction or adjustment programs. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The efficiency of child support policies will have a strong impact on 
noncustodial fathers who have been in the child support system for a long time.   
 
 
A Role of Fathers’ Ability to Pay Child Support in Arrear Growth Model 
A long history of empirical research has generally found that a nonresident father’s 
ability to pay is positively associated with child support compliance (Garfinkel, Glei, & 





Miller, Garfinkel, & McLanahan, 1997; Sinkewicz & Garfinkel, 2009; Sorensen, 1997a). While 
the early studies often use fathers’ income as a proxy for ability to pay (Bartfeld & Meyer, 1994, 
2003; C. Miller et al., 1997; Sonenstein & Calhoun, 1990; Sorensen, 1997a, p. 199), later studies 
have presented new estimates of the ability to pay, that include incarceration (Geller, Garfinkel, 
& Western, 2011), multiple fertility (Sinkewicz & Garfinkel, 2009), and the burden of the order 
(Meyer, Ha, & Hu, 2008).  
The evidence of child support compliance appears to be consistent with the context of a 
father’s arrears accumulation (Kim et al., 2015). Evidence from a study of nine large states 
suggests that low-income fathers are likely to owe a large amount of arrears (Sorensen et al., 
2007). More specifically, fathers who make less than $10,000 per year owe two-thirds of child 
support debt. The study also showed that 54 percent of total arrears were owed by 11 percent of 
the noncustodial parents, and each of these “high debtors” owed $30,000 or more (Sorensen et 
al., 2007). The most recent data from OCSE Federal Offset Debtor File found similar results, 
showing that only 17 percent of obligors owed 55 percent of total arrears, and each of these 
debtors owed $40,000 or more (Putze, 2017).  
The high rates of arrears accumulation among low-income fathers may stem from their 
limited ability to access labor markets (Sorensen & Zibman, 2001). Prior research provided a list 
of potential barriers to work, which can take the form of poor work history, low educational 
attainment, dependence on drugs or alcohol, and health limitations (S. Danziger et al., 2000; S. 
K. Danziger & Seefeldt, 2003; Lipscomb, Loomis, McDonald, Argue, & Wing, 2006; Pugh, 
1998). The presence of such barriers to work would likely hamper low-income fathers’ ability to 
find and (if employed) maintain employment. If the father loses his job, there is a time lag 





income fathers may be less likely to comply with their obligations, resulting in an accumulation 
of arrears more rapidly than other fathers who do comply. 
The fathers’ ability to pay may also change over time due to men’s increasing patterns of 
income over the life course (Garfinkel, McLanahan, Meadows, Mincy, & others, 2009; Percheski 
& Wildeman, 2008a; Phillips & Garfinkel, 1993). A study conducted by Nepomnyaschy and 
Garfinkel (2010) outlined a hypothesis that a father’s growing ability to pay child support over 
time may explain the upswings in total cash support. However, the authors point out that this 
hypothesis needs to be substantiated by additional research (Nepomnyaschy & Garfinkel, 2010). 
In the Wisconsin study of arrear trajectories, half of the fathers with arrears paid-off their debts 
after they owed the maximum amount of arrears (Kim et al., 2015).  
Fathers’ Relationship Status with the Mother of their Child at the Time of Birth 
In the past half-century, there has been a substantial increase in the number of children 
who were born outside of marriage (Bumpass & Lu, 2000). According to 2015 data from the 
National Vital Statistics System, about 40 percent of all children were born out of wedlock, with 
much higher rates among African Americans (Hamilton, Martin, & Osterman, 2016).  
Fathers are less involved with their nonresident child if they have not lived together at 
some point after the birth of their child. Previous research found that fathers who were never 
married to or had never lived with their children’s mother were less likely than ever-married or 
ever-cohabited fathers to pay child support (Carlson & McLanahan, 2002; Nepomnyaschy & 
Garfinkel, 2010), or other forms of assistance (Paasch & Teachman, 1991). Part of the reason for 
this discrepancy may be associated with nonresident fathers’ willingness to pay child support. 
That is, as pointed out by Weiss and Willis (1985), fathers who have never cohabited with the 





monitor the allocation of the child support transfer. In addition, fathers who are not co-residential 
are likely to form new partnerships and have additional children with more than one partner 
(Edin & Nelson, 2013). The empirical evidence has indicated that noncustodial fathers will be 
less involved with their nonresident children when either or both parents have newborn children 
(Manning & Smock, 2000; Rangarajan & Gleason, 1998), although Mincy Pouncy and 
Zilanawala (2016) found that the visitation rates of never resident fathers were as high as its rates 
of fathers who live with their child at birth.  
Despite the substantial evidence supporting the role of fathers’ willingness to pay as a 
determinant of child support compliance, their role in predicting arrears accumulation remains 
controversial. This is because fathers in the formal system are already obligated to pay child 
support so they have no incentive to provide additional informal cash support voluntarily. In 
addition, a father’s willingness to pay may not influence the payment behavior of fathers who are 
employed in the formal labor market, because child support payments are automatically deducted 
from their paychecks (Bartfeld & Meyer, 2003; Lin, 2000).  
A more plausible explanation for the differences in arrears accumulation between the two 
types of family structures (fathers in the stable relationship vs fathers in the less stable 
relationship) may come from a “selection effect,” which postulates that economically and 
emotionally disadvantaged fathers are more likely to be selected into a less stable relationship 
(Conger et al., 1990, 1992). That being said, according to Gary Becker’s “gain to trade” model of 
marriage, men with a lower disposable income are considered less attractive partners in, even if 
women have a child between such men (Becker, 1973; Bumpass, Sweet, & Cherlin, 1991; 





fathers in less stable relationships would be at higher risk of accumulating child support debt 
because they are much more economically vulnerable than fathers in stable relationships.  
In short, existing literature provides clear evidence that the accumulation of child support 
arrears can be intertwined with fathers’ relationship with the mother of their child. While the vast 
majority of previous studies have focused on couples who have previously married and divorced, 
a growing number of recent studies have attempted to focus on child support outcomes for 
nonresident couples after childbirth (Nepomnyaschy & Garfinkel, 2010). However, no previous 
studies of which I am aware have addressed whether the trajectories of arrears vary depending 
upon fathers’ residential status with their child at birth.  
It is also likely that a heavier arrears burden may be imposed on fathers who are required 
to pay child support retroactively after the order is established. More specifically, a father who 
has to pay the interest charged on a retrospective order, along with unpaid due child support, can 
accumulate arrears more rapidly than a father who does not. Of course, the former is more likely 
to have had an unstable relationship with the mother of his child than the latter. Based on these 
considerations, I propose a related hypothesis.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: Compared to fathers who live with their child at birth, fathers who were 
nonresident at birth are more likely to accumulate a greater amount of child support arrears 
over time. 
The government’s efforts to reduce the accumulation of arrears may not be as efficient 
for fathers in an unstable relationship with the mother as it is for those in a stable relationship. 
Prior empirical work indicates that fathers who have never cohabited with the mother, as 
compared to those who have cohabited, are less likely to be impacted by efficient child support 
enforcement (Nepomnyaschy & Garfinkel, 2010). To test whether those results obtained from 
Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel’s work can also be found in the context of child support arrears, 





HYPOTHESIS 4: The improvement of the government’s efforts is more effective in reducing the 





The study uses data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS, 
hereafter), a longitudinal birth cohort study of approximately 5,000 children born into 20 large 
cities with populations over 200,000 in the United States between 1998 and 2000 (Reichman, 
Teitler, Garfinkel, & McLanahan, 2001). The FFCWS is a longitudinal birth cohort study 
designed to explore a comprehensive understanding of unmarried parents and their children. The 
nonmarital births were oversampled and represented 75 percent of the total sample of the study 
at baseline interview (3,712 nonmarital birth VS. 1,186 marital births). The cities were chosen by 
a stratified random sampling procedure based on welfare generosity, the strength of the child 
support system, and the strength of the local labor market. Based on being classified as either 
high, medium, or low level of strictness for each of those three characteristics, cities were chosen 
at random from the nine clusters formed. This accounts for 16 of the cities.4 Four additional 
cities5 were selected due to funders’ interest (Reichman et al., 2001). The parents of each focal 
child were interviewed in the hospital when the child was born (February 1998 to September 
2000 / wave 1), and the follow-up interviews were conducted by phone when the focal child was 
one (June 1999 to March 2002 / wave 2), three (April 2001 to December 2003 / wave 3), five 
(July 2003 to February 2006 / wave 4), and nine (February 2007 to 2011 / wave 5).  The rate of 
attrition tends to increase over the long-term: the response rate at baseline and each of the 
                                                          
4 This includes Boston, Pittsburgh, Toledo, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Indianapolis, Richmond, Jacksonville, 
Baltimore, San Jose, Austin, Chicago, San Antonio, New York, and Corpus Christi.  





following four waves were 100%, 89%, 86%, 85% and 72% for mothers, and 78%, 69%, 67%, 
64%, and 54% for fathers, respectively (FFCWS, 2017). 
Analytic Sample 
 The analysis of the current study uses 7,944 repeated observations (2,781 unique 
observations) of all fathers who were not living with the mother of the focal child since the 1-
year follow-up. A decision to include all noncustodial fathers instead of focusing on those with 
child support orders was made based on several considerations. First, it is possible that some 
nonresident fathers with no formal child support obligations would have established child 
support orders had they lived in a state with different child support policies. Therefore, excluding 
these fathers from the analytic sample may lower the external validity of the study. In addition, 
the results for censored data analysis usually demonstrate less bias than for truncated data. A 
previous simulation study for the developmental processes showed that bias in estimating the 
treatment effects created by left-truncated data was twice as large as the bias created by left-
censored data (Cain et al., 2011).  
Consistent with previous studies (Nepomnyaschy & Garfinkel, 2010), I also retain fathers 
who were married to or cohabitating with the child’s mother at baseline, in part to explore 
whether the results vary depending upon parents’ relationship status at childbirth. The analytic 
sample is further restricted to fathers who were not deceased, not unknown, nor awarded primary 
custody of the focal child at any wave. These exclusion criteria led to a final sample size of 1,521 
for 1-year follow-up, 1,815 for 3-year follow-up, 2,160 for 5-year follow-up, and 2,448 for 9-
year follow-up survey. It seems that the number of observations increases as time passes, partly 





presumed that the ratio of fathers with orders to the total number of noncustodial fathers has 
increased over time. 
Missing Data 
As a panel study, FFCWS data suffers from attrition, which can result in biased 
estimation as long as the attrition is not missing completely at random. Panel attrition can also 
reduce the analytic sample size, resulting in wider confidence intervals as the margin of error 
increases. Moreover, non-random attrition can threaten the external validity of the study results 
by introducing potential selection biases that may distort the causal link between treatment and 
outcomes. To account for such problems, the current study used multiple imputation using 
chained equation (MICE), the most advanced imputation technique in social science so far 
(White, Royston, & Wood, 2011). Unlike other imputation techniques, MI uses multiple 
complete data sets with multiple times to impute missingness. The main advantage of using the 
MICE technique is related to its feasibility to handle many complex patterns of missing data, 
although the process of its implementation can be more difficult. However, software packages, 
such as STATA, allow researchers to avoid such complexity. Next, the confidence intervals of 
the study results will have correct coverage properties, as MI addresses more types of 
uncertainties about the missing values than any other imputation technique. For instance, the 
regression imputation approach assumes that the coefficients taken from the points on the 
regression line are true values of the parameter estimates. The MI approach, on the other hand, is 
skeptical of this assumption due to the uncertainty of the model’s parameter values. To address 
this type of uncertainty, this technique draws the coefficient values from an appropriate 







The duration of the child support obligation 
 The duration of the child support obligation is measured at each wave, starting from one-
year follow-up interviews, based on the mother’s report. Mothers were first asked whether they 
have a legal agreement or child support order that requires fathers to contribute to children. If 
mothers answered “yes”, they were asked when the legal agreement was first reached. The 
duration of the child support obligation can be measured by calculating the time interval between 
the date of the legal agreement and the date the mother was interviewed at each wave.  By using 
years as a unit of analysis, the duration of child support obligation is interpreted as the elapsed 
number of years since the legal order was established. The measure is rounded to one if the 
length of legal obligation is less than one but greater than zero. 
Accumulated child support arrears  
The amount of accumulated child support arrears is measured across each wave, starting 
from one-year follow-up interviews, primarily reported by mothers. They were first asked 
whether the father has any arrears that he is supposed to pay to the mother or the government. If 
they answered “yes”, then they were further asked the amount of the arrears that the father 
actually accrued. For mothers who had child support orders, but who did not respond to the 
question about arrears, the study assumed that the amount of arrears is equivalent to the 
difference between the amount of child support owed and the amount received. It was 
additionally assumed that the amount of arrears is zero for fathers who complied with child 
support obligations in full. The annual amount of arrears accrued was adjusted to 2001 dollars 





 It is evident that the mother’s report of the father’s child support debts can be claimed as 
an imperfect measurement. For example, as Miller and Mincy (2012) pointed out, mothers may 
under-report the actual amount of arrears owed by fathers because they have little information 
about the unpaid amount of child support owed to children of different mothers. However, unlike 
Miller and Mincy’s work, this study does not address the question of whether the arrears are 
affecting or being affected by fathers’ behaviors. In addition, missing information on arrears can 
also be considered as measurement errors on the dependent variable, which will end up in the 
regression error but do not bias the regression results6  (see Appendix 1).   
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of mothers against the amount of arrears owed by the 
children’s fathers. Consistent with prior research (Kim et al., 2015; Sorensen et al., 2007), a 
significant number of mothers do not have arrears owed by the fathers. However, once the 
arrears are present, then the amount is high. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the average amount of 
child support arrears increases from one wave to the next  
Performance measures on current and past-due child support collections 
 Fathers living in different states will be exposed to different degrees of enforcement 
“treatment,” allowing researchers to use a natural experiment methodology to study the 
effectiveness of child support enforcement (CSE) system. To construct a valid measure that 
captures the effectiveness of the system, the study uses a performance-based method prescribed 
by the performance-based incentive and penalty program under the Child Support Performance 
and Incentive Act of 1998 (CSPIA). Among the five criteria used in the program, this research 
                                                          






explores two performance measurements, current and arrearage collections, that are expected to 
have the most salient impacts on fathers’ arrears accumulation.  
 The construction of the performance measures assigned to each observation unfolds in 
two steps: First, data on performance indicators were collected from the Office of Child Support 
Enforcement (OCSE) annual reports (1999-2010). Both indicators were measured as 
percentages, and the method of measuring each indicator is given in Appendix 2. For the next 
step, the performance indicators were assigned to each observation, based on the state where the 
mother established the child support order. To avoid the issue of temporal ordering, the 
performance indicators were measured one-year prior to the mother’s interview year for each 
wave. Figure 2 graphically illustrates trends in both performance measures used in the study. As 
suggested in the Figure, the results of both performance measures have improved significantly 
over the period from 1999 to 2010, when the mothers in FFCWS had one to nine-year follow-up 
interviews (for detailed information on performance measures for each state, see Appendix 3-1 
and 3-2). 
Covariates 
A number of baseline characteristics are associated with fathers’ ability to pay child 
support are added to the model. These include age, education level (high school dropouts, high 
school graduates, some college, and college graduates), race and ethnicity (White, Black, 
Hispanic, Other), cognitive functioning (0=low to 15 high; Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
Revised; WAIS-R, 1981), depressive symptoms (0= not depressed, 1=depressed; measured at 
wave 2 based on the World Health Organization’s Composite International Diagnostic Interview-
Short Form ; CIDI, 1998), fathers’ number of children, and relationship status with the mother at 





  A set of time-varying covariates are also added to the model. First, I use an individual-
level time-varying covariate that assumed to be correlated with fathers’ ability to pay child 
support: this includes a mother-reported fathers’ jail status variable (father ever in jail since past 
wave) constructed by FFCWS at each given wave (1=Yes, 0=No). Next, I used a set of state-
level time-varying covariates that are assumed to be correlated with both performance measures 
and fathers’ arrears outcome. These include an unemployment rate, a poverty rate (percent of a 
person in poverty), a proportion of children in single-parent families, a proportion of people who 
went to college, and a proportion of people born in the United States.7 To avoid the reverse 
causality problem, all state-level variables used in the study were measured one-year prior to the 
mother’s interview year. For ease of interpretation, each state-level covariate is standardized to a 
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, but unstandardized values are presented in Table 1. 
  Lastly, to control for both state and annual fixed effects, a series of dummy variables for 
each state and mothers’ interview year are added to the model. In particular, it is important to 
include the mother’s interview year in the model, because the changes in the long-term trend of 
performance measures can lead to biased estimates of true policy effectiveness. More 
specifically, it can be misinterpreted as if the positive relationship between arrears and elapsed 
years are the result of the changes in performance measures that have steadily increased since 
2001 (See Figure 2). Including a set of dummy variables indicating the mother’s interview years 
in the model can solve this problem by fixing changes in trends over time.  
 Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics for variables used in the analysis. The first 
six columns represent fathers’ baseline demographic characteristics for the main analytic sample 
(N=2,781), stratified by relationship status with child’s mothers at the time of childbirth. When 
                                                          





compared to the non-resident sub-sample (N=1,421), fathers in the resident sub-sample 
(N=1,360) were older, less likely to be Black, have post-secondary schooling, and had more 
children. The next eight columns represent time-varying covariates for repeated observations 
across an individual over time (N=7,944). On average, fathers in the sample are more likely to be 
in jail over time. Except for the poverty rate and the proportion of individuals who attended 
college, most state-level time-varying covariates remained constant from year 1 to year 9 follow-
up interviews.  
Analytic Strategy 
Tobit Analysis 
The estimation of arrears trajectories using the standard regression model will lead to 
inconsistent and biased estimates of the parameters of interest. This is, as explained above, 
because many observations are clustered at zero when the child support order has not been 
established. To obtain consistent and unbiased parameter estimates, the study uses Tobit 
analysis. The idea of this model is a combination of Probit and Truncated regression models, 
allowing researchers to predict whether or not the dependent variable is at zero and, if not zero, 
to estimate the expected value of the uncensored distribution (Breen, 1996; Greene, 1981, 2000). 
The structural equation of the standard Tobit model is given below: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡    𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0
0                              𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
} (1) 
where 𝜖𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑  𝑁(0, 𝜎
2), and 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is a latent variable (accumulation of arrears) for father i 
(reported by mother) at wave t (2 to 5). The 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 matrix represents the specification for two 
multivariate models. The first model is a baseline model estimating changes in debt 










Where 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 is the number of years that have passed since the child support order was 
established; 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time-varying covariates (state-level covariates were measured 1 
year prior to the mother’s interview year); 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of time-invariant covariates; State is a 
set of dummy variables indicating the state where child support was established; and 𝑖_𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the 
survey year for each i at which the arrears were measured. As for the coefficients of interest, the 
intercept 𝛽0 represents an initial status of child support arrears that remain constant over time (at 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡=0) and the slope 𝛽1 refers to the growth rate on the trajectories of child support arrears 
over time.  The 𝛽1 is also defined as a case-length effect, which refers to the changes in the 
accumulation of child support arrears depending on the time between the date the order was 
established and the date the arrears were measured.  
The second model analysis is a moderation model, examining the extent to which 
changes in performance measures affect debts accumulation over time. Results should show 
whether the outcome of the first regression model varies depending on the performance 
measures. The estimation equation is as follows: 
 







Where (𝑃𝑀)𝑖𝑡 denotes each performance measure; and the interaction term, (𝑃𝑀 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡, 
indicates if the growth rate on the trajectories of child support arrears differs depending on each 
performance measure.  
Results are presented as marginal effects on the expected value for arrearage outcomes 
for both censored and uncensored observations (so, the intercept 𝛽0 is not stated in the result). 





model depends not just on the coefficient itself, but also on the values of all other variables in the 
equation. 8 Since the interaction term presented in Eq3 is composed of two continuous variables, 
it is advisable to set these two variables to discrete values so that results can be readily 
interpreted. Therefore, when estimating marginal effects, the performance measure values are set 
at a one standard deviation interval around the mean9 and the elapsed year indicator is set at a 
one-year interval.10 
To estimate the parameters of interest, statistical software packages, such as Stata use the 
following (log)-likelihood function for the censored normal distribution (see Appendix III for 
derivation):  
 
ln 𝐿 = ∑ ln 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑦𝑖𝑡>0



















                                                          
8 In the Tobit model, the marginal effects on the expected value of the outcome (censored and 







for changes in variable 𝑥1 if the variable is not a part of the interaction term, and 
𝜕𝐸[𝑦|𝑥1, 𝑋]
𝜕𝑥2




for changes in variable 𝑥2 if the variable is a part of the interaction term (𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) (Ai & Norton, 2003; 





) is an adjustment factor, indicating the estimated probability of observing an 
uncensored observation given the value of 𝑋𝑖𝑡. Therefore, the marginal effect of X would be equal to an 
expected value of 𝛽 if the Φ (
𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽
𝜎
) is equal to 1 (meaning that there are no censored observations). 
9 As presented in Figure 2, both arrearage collection and current collection measures have a mean value 
of .60, but as for a standard deviation, the arrearage collection is .06 and the current collection is .09. 
10 This type of marginal effects is usually termed as “marginal effects at a representative value (MER)” in 





where f(.) and F(.) denote the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative density 
function (CDF) of the latent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , respectively, and 𝜙 and Φ represent the PDF and the 
CDF of the standard normal distribution. The log-likelihood function consists of two parts: The 
first part is the likelihood function for the classical OLS under 𝑦𝑖𝑡 > 0 (uncensored), whereas the 
second part is the probability function that the outcome is censored.  
 Instrumental Variable Estimation for the Measurement Errors 
OCSE’s annual reports were believed to be the most accurate source to measure state 
performance measurements. The OCSE Office of Audit is now responsible for assessing the 
completeness, accuracy, and reliability of the states’ reporting system. The Data Reliability 
Audits (DRA) proclaimed that the reliability of state reporting system has improved since 1999 
(Huang & Edwards, 2009). Despite OCSE’s efforts towards minimizing reporting errors, states 
still have incentives to over-report their performance measures, resulting in a potential upward 
bias in our estimates (See Appendix 1 for the explanation as to why the measurement errors in 
the performance measures may result in biased results). In order to adjust for the potential 
measurement errors that can occur, this paper used state expenditures on enforcement as an 
instrument to predict performance in the subsequent analysis. In doing so, the changes in the 
level of the performance measure are explained only through state expenditures on arrears. 
Following the notation used by Angrist and Pischke (2008), the instrumental variable 
model is estimated using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. The first stage can be 
written as Equation (2):  
 𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1
𝑇𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
where 𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 denotes the performance measured for state i at year t; 𝑎𝑖 is the state-effect constant 





Time-invariant covariates with state and year dummies); 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the expenditure variable (IV); 
and 𝛿𝑡 is the time-trend effect (constant across states).  In accordance with the method used by 
Huang and Edwards(2009), the expenditure variable will be measured by an inverse ratio of each 
state’s total number of OCSE caseloads to the number of full-time staff members.  
It is assumed that states with high expenditures on child support systems are expected to 
spend more on hiring full-time workers, and as a result, the child support caseload per capita is 
expected to decrease. Note that Time-variant confounders and 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 variable that were measured 
one-year prior to the mother’s interview year for each wave were used. In the second stage, the 
actual performance measures used in the original equation (3) are substituted into the predicted 
performance measures estimated from the first-stage regression. For ease of interpretation, the 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 variable is standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
 To be valid, the instrument used in the analysis must satisfy two requirements: it must be 
predictive of the performance measures, and orthogonal to any other determinants on an 
accumulation of arrears except the performance measure. The first condition is assumed to be 
satisfied based on the evidence provided by Huang and Edwards (2009) suggesting that the 
indicator of state expenditures on the enforcement is one of three dimensions that causes the 
child support performance index. The second condition also appears to be fulfilled since the 
government’s expenditure on enforcement affects the accumulation of arrears only through its 
effects on the state’s efforts in managing arrears. The first condition is tested and reported in the 
current study. If the expenditures could serve as a good instrument by passing these two 
conditions, then theoretically the variances in the performance measure can be purged of the 





usually higher than that of OLS estimator and is assumed to be the same in Tobit models used in 
this study.  
IV. RESULTS 
Accumulation of Child Support Arrears over Time (Case-Length Effect) 
 With reference to equation (2), I begin the multivariate Tobit analysis by estimating the 
effects of elapsed time since the establishment of child support orders (hereafter elapsed time) on 
an accumulation of child support arrears. In this study, I define this effect as a case-length effect, 
which refers to the changes in the accumulation of child support arrears depending on the time 
between the date the order was established and the date the arrears were measured. Results are 
presented as marginal effects in Table 2. In the first column, only the elapsed time indicator as a 
key independent variable is included. The result is consistent with my first Hypothesis that the 
longer the father stays in the child support system, the greater the debt to be accumulated. More 
specifically, fathers in the overall analytic sample accumulate a new arrear of $433.43 on 
average per every year after establishing the child support order.  
 In the next two columns, a set of covariates is included, along with state and year fixed 
effects. The case-length effects have slightly decreased ($415.92 and $407.16 per year), but are 
statistically significant even after adjusting for an array of covariates and state-and year fixed 
effects. Consistent with a host of prior studies, fathers are accumulating less arrears as they get 
older, indicating that the fathers’ ability to pay child support increases over time (Garfinkel et al., 
2009; Percheski & Wildeman, 2008b; Phillips & Garfinkel, 1993). In addition, fathers who have 
more children accumulate a greater amount of arrears than fathers who have fewer children and 
lower intelligence scores. The accumulation of arrears is estimated to be smaller for Black 





lines. Though at first glance these racial differences might seem counterintuitive, White fathers 
are more likely than Black fathers to have a greater amount of child support obligations because 
they have a relatively higher income than their Black counterparts. Therefore, more White 
fathers will accumulate more arrears than Black fathers if they do not fulfill their obligations. 
Lastly, fathers who were in jail are estimated to have about $200 more in child support arrears 
per year than fathers who were not in jail.  
 The final two columns disaggregate the sample by parents’ relationship status at the time 
of the focal child’s birth. The fathers who lived with the child’s mother at the time of childbirth 
(hereafter resident group) have a lower amount of arrears accumulation over time after 
establishing a child support order than those fathers who did not live with the mother at the time 
of childbirth (hereafter nonresident group). More specifically, the fathers in the resident group 
accumulate new arrears of $350.72 on average per year after establishing the order, while the 
fathers in the nonresident group accumulate new arrears of $421.80 annually. The effects of 
covariates on the accumulation of arrears also vary by this relationship sub-group. Fathers’ 
intelligence seems to play an important role in accumulating arrears in the resident group, but not 
in the nonresident group. On the other hand, race/ethnicity is a significant factor contributing to 
the accumulation of arrears only in the nonresident group. Finally, the fathers in the resident 
group accumulate arrears nearly three times more than their nonresident group counterparts if 
they were in prison during the survey period.  
Moderation Effects of CSPIA’s Performance measures on Accumulation of Child Support 
Arrears over Time 
The case-length effects presented in Table 2 may vary depending on the different CSE 
agencies and its strategies. The interactive models in Figure 3 and Table 3 show variations in 





(Panel 1) and arrearage collection (Panel 2) – which are used as proxy measures for the 
effectiveness of CSE system. Each regression model controls for a host of time-invariant and 
time-varying characteristics along with state and year fixed effects. The performance measure 
values are set at a one standard deviation interval around the mean and the elapsed year indicator 
is set at a one-year interval. 
Performance measures assumed to be constant over time 
The current study estimates the moderating effects in two ways. First, I stratify the case-
length effect by each performance measure that is assumed to be constant over time.11 Results are 
visually displayed in Figure 3 using the marginsplot command implemented in Stata15. The 
solid line represents the growth trajectory of arrears for fathers who live in the states where the 
focal performance measure is at the mean, and the dotted line represents the same growth 
trajectory but only for fathers in the states where the performance measure is one standard 
deviation above the mean. Note that the gray-shaded area indicates 90% confidence interval for 
expected p-values. The results reported in Panel 1 provide support for Hypothesis 2 that the 
efficiency of child support policies has a strong impact on noncustodial fathers who have been in 
the child support system for a long time.  That is to say, the case-length effect is higher for 
fathers who live in the states with less effective child support enforcement when compared with 
fathers who live in the states with more effective enforcement.  
More specifically, suppose that fathers have been accumulating arrears for four years 
since the order was established. If these fathers lived in states where the current collection 
                                                          
11 With reference to Equation (3). the conditional marginal effect of this interactive model in the Tobit 
framework can be expressed as 
𝜕𝐸[𝑌|𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠, 𝑃𝑀, 𝑋]
𝜕𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡









performance is 60 percent12, they would accumulate additional arrears of $1,479.11 for next year. 
By contrast, fathers who lived in states where the current performance is 69 percent13 would 
accumulate additional arrears of only $847.87 under the same condition.  
Furthermore, the gaps in the case-length effect between the fathers from states with high- 
and low-performance in CSE were becoming more pronounced over time. For instance, if the 
elapsed time is at 3 years, the difference in case-length effect between the two groups of states is 
$208.14 [$801.36 - $593.22], whereas if the elapsed time increases to 7 years, then the difference 
becomes $ 602.87 [$1952.08 - $1349.21]. Therefore, promoting the effectiveness of the CSE 
system would alleviate the burden of arrears for fathers and provides more benefits to these 
fathers over time. 14Results are consistent with those in Panel 2, except that the gaps are not 
statistically significant across the elapsed years.  
Allow performance measures to change over time 
While the first approach is intuitive in visualizing the moderating effects, it does not 
provide policymakers with enough information about how much the arrears accumulate if the 
performance measures change over time. To overcome this limitation, the second approach 
estimates the conditional marginal effects of the performance measure on an accumulation of 
child support arrears at each elapsed year.15 For the sake of brevity, the results of the second 
approach presented in Table 3 show only the most relevant information (full results are available 
upon request).  
                                                          
12 Note that mean value of the current collection measure is 60 percent 
13 Note that one standard deviation above the mean of current collection measure is 69 percent 
14 For instance, the Start Smart program recently implemented in Texas would be the best example of CSE 
policies that might result in increased collection of current child support. See Farrell and Morrison (2019) 
for more details.  
15 The same as above, the conditional marginal effect of this interactive model can be expressed as: 
𝜕𝐸[𝑌|𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠, 𝑃𝑀. 𝑋]
𝜕𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡








There are several notable findings from the second approach. First, an increase in 
performance measures after a long elapsed time can reduce arrears more substantially than it 
does in a short elapsed time. For instance, suppose that fathers have been accumulating arrears 
for five years since the order was established. Assuming that performance measures have 
changed at this time, the results in the first column of Panel 1 show that the increase in the 
current collection by one standard deviation from the mean is expected to decrease the arrears by 
$918.23. However, if the performance measures change when the elapsed time is ten years, then 
the amount of arrears is expected to be decreased by $2,034.07 under the same condition.  
On the contrary, the improvement of the CSE system cannot moderate the case-length 
effects when the elapsed period is short. That is, the difference in the level of performance 
measure does not contribute to the changes in arrears for the first two years after the order is 
established (results not shown in Table 3).  
The amount of arrears that are reduced due to an increase in performance measure is not 
constant but rather increases over time. If the arrears were to decrease linearly, then the reduced 
amount of arrears when the elapsed time is 7 years would be $242.90*7/3=$566.77 or 
918.23*7/5=$1,285.52, which are much smaller than what was estimated in the current study 
($2,034.07). These results are quite similar to those in Panel 2 using the arrearage collection as a 
performance measure. 
Lastly, suppose that states may require the same, or at least similar, efforts to increase 
one standard deviation from the mean for both performance measures. Since the overall values of 
arrears in Panel 1 are lower than the corresponding values in Panel 2, the current collection 
performance may be a more efficient tool for predicting the reduction in child support arrears 





Results stratified by the fathers’ residential status during childbirth 
The second and third columns in both Panels of Table 3 indicate that the increase in 
performance of CSE system decreases the case-length effects more rapidly for fathers who were 
resident at birth than for fathers who were nonresident at birth. If the arrears have been 
accumulating for 7 years since the order was established, fathers who were resident at birth and 
who live in states with the current collection of 69 percent are estimated to accumulate $3,251.40 
less in arrears than fathers who live in states with the current collection of approximately 60 
percent. On the other hand, as presented the third column of Panel 1, the reduction in arrears for 
fathers in the nonresident group is much smaller than the reduction in arrears for fathers in the 
resident group under the same condition ($-3,251.40 vs $-1,121.17). Results in the second and 
third column of Panel 2 show similar findings.  
Furthermore, the fathers in the nonresident group need more time than the fathers in the 
resident group do to get benefits from the effectiveness of CSE system. More specifically, the 
moderation effects of the CSE enforcement become significant for fathers in the nonresident 
group when the elapsed time reaches to 7 years, whereas those fathers in the resident group need 
only 3 years. These results suggest that the improvement of performance on the CSE system is 
more effective in reducing the arrears for the fathers in the resident group than those fathers in 
the nonresident group. 
Supplemental Analysis 
 The study also uses instrumental variable techniques to remove possible measurement 
errors that could bias the estimates upward. In each panel of Table 4, the first row presents the 
results from the first-stage equation predicting performance measures. As the results for both 





current or arrears collections), the regression results for the current collection measure is the only 
one presented. The results from the first row suggest that a one standard deviation increase in 
expenditures on child support systems is associated with a 0.1 to 0.14 standard deviation increase 
in current performance measure, indicating that the present instrument yields a reliable 
estimation of performance measures. The results from the second row to the fifth row of the 
2SLS show the estimated amount of arrears reduced by the moderating effect of performance 
measures, which have been instrumented with the expenditure variable. The predicted 
performance measures obtained from the first stage of 2SLS have significant marginal effects on 
the accumulation of child support arrears. However, as expected, the standard error on 
performance measures have also increased slightly compared to the model without IV regression. 
The moderating effects of the predicted performance measures have increased slightly compared 
to the Tobit model without IV regression, suggesting that this supplemental analysis has 
corrected for the upward bias induced by measurements errors.  
V. DISCUSSION 
 The last step of the child support enforcement process is to collect accrued child support 
payments owed either to custodial families or to the government. Theoretically, states’ efforts to 
collect current or delinquent child support payments on the growth in individual's child support 
arrears are as important as other microeconomic factors, such as fathers’ ability and willingness 
to fulfill their child support responsibilities. However, relatively little research has been carried 
out on the policy intervention associated with long-term arrears accumulation. Moreover, many 
previous studies ignore fathers who were nonresident at the time of the child’s birth. The main 
contribution of this paper is to close these gaps by examining how the improvement of CSE 





data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. The CSPIA’s performance measures 
were used as a proxy measurement for the effectiveness of the CSE system.  
Consistent with previous research, the current study found that the accumulation of 
arrears showed, on average, a continuous increase after the establishment of the child support 
order. This is because once the arrears are accumulated, the amount will continue to snowball 
due to the interest charged on the arrears (Sorensen et al., 2007). The study was also the first to 
provide support for the notion that the effectiveness of the CSE system contributes to a faster 
reduction of arrears. That being said, fathers living in states with less efficient child support 
enforcement were estimated to accumulate more arrears over time than those fathers living in 
states with more efficient enforcement. Furthermore, the longer the time has elapsed since the 
order was established, the greater the amount of arrears will be reduced when the performance 
measure increases. These findings provide the evidence that states’ effort to collect both current 
and overdue child support payments could be one of the factors that determine diverse patterns 
of arrears accumulation. These patterns, as introduced by Kim et al. (2015), include "a 
continuous increase" or "a continuous increase then decrease at some point.” 
The long-term trajectories of arrears accumulation varied substantially depending on the 
fathers’ residential status during childbirth. The results obtained indicate that fathers who did not 
live with their child at the time of the birth were more likely to fall further behind in paying-off 
their child support debts over time, compared to those fathers who lived with their child at birth. 
One of the potential reasons for the discrepancy in results between these two groups may be that 
the fathers in the nonresident group might be obligated to pay retroactive child support after the 
order is set, and as a result, may suffer more from arrears burden than those fathers in the 





addressed in future research. Another potential reason may be that fathers in the nonresident 
group are economically more vulnerable than those fathers in the resident group do because of 
their limited ability to access labor markets. This hypothesis was consistent with a recent study 
by Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel (2010).  
The study also showed that states’ efforts to collect delinquent child support payments for 
fathers in the nonresident group were not as successful as such efforts targeting those fathers in 
the resident group. For instance, suppose these two groups of fathers have the same elapsed time 
since the order was established. If the performance measures increase by one standard deviation 
from its mean, fathers who were resident at birth will accumulate smaller amounts of arrears than 
those fathers who were nonresident at birth. Part of the reason for such discrepancy may be that 
those fathers who become high debtors are likely to have an unstable relationship with the 
mother at birth and are not eligible to apply for child support programs that reduce the existing 
arrears. For instance, the eligible population for such arrears reduction program is, in general, 
restricted to noncustodial fathers with less arrears burden and who have no history of late 
payment within the last six months. If the noncustodial fathers have arrears owed to custodial 
mothers, the local child support agency must contact to those mothers to ask for a voluntary 
compromise of arrears. If the custodial mothers do not agree to the compromise, then the 
noncustodial fathers must pay the full amount of arrears owed to custodial parents. Therefore, 
those fathers who are not in the stable relationship with the mother of their child will face great 
difficulty getting benefits from this program and as a result, would fall further behind in paying 
off their debts.  
 Due to limited resources, many local enforcement agencies may not be able to provide 





obligations. Therefore, the agencies sometimes may have to reluctantly decide which practices or 
strategies they should employ to achieve the goals. Based on these considerations, suppose that 
the state-level child support agencies have limited resources that could be used for improving 
either the current or the arrearage collection performances. According to the findings from the 
current study, the reduction in arrears caused by a one-standard deviation increase in current 
performance measure is much larger than that reduction caused by the same standard deviation 
increase in arrearage performance measure.  
In sum, the results from the current study have several implications for child support 
policy. The study found strong evidence that efficient child support enforcement leads to a long-
term decrease in the accumulation of arrears. This study also finds strong evidence that more 
efficient child support enforcement policies convey greater benefits to children who lived with 
their father at birth than children who did not. These findings align with the efforts from 
policymakers and researchers who have sought to find various strategies to encourage fathers to 
be with their children at the time of birth.  
 Despite the encouraging findings of this study, it is worth mentioning a few caveats. 
First, as aforementioned in the previous section, measurement errors on the dependent variable 
due to the use of the mother’s report of the father’s child support debt may slightly reduce 
overall statistical power. Therefore, the results of this study can be replicated when new data that 
contains complete information on the actual amount of arrears owed by fathers is available. 
Second, although the study used the two-stage least square method to account for potential bias 
occurring from measurement error of performance measure, the instrumental variable used in 





Therefore, future research could explore additional instrumental variables to minimize the 
variance of the estimator.  
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Table 2. Multivariate Model for Assessing Effects of Elapsed Time Since the Establishment of 
Child Support Orders on an Accumulation of Child Support Arrears: Based on Tobit Analysis. 
 Full Full Full Resident Nonresident 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of elapsed years since the 
establishment of the orders 433.43*** 415.92*** 407.16*** 350.72*** 421.80*** 
  (18.29) (20.88) (20.70) (67.14) (30.94) 
Fathers' age in years  -23.06*** -21.40*** -26.87*** -17.60+ 
   (5.99) (5.72) (8.03) (9.69) 
Fathers' education  
(versus high school dropouts)      
   High school degree  -11.85 -5.37 -26.52 -23.29 
   (66.43) (64.69) (100.69) (90.82) 
   Some college  -6.29 9.77 -8.46 -3.57 
   (100.63) (102.50) (128.57) (127.59) 
   College degree  -248.16 -173.80 -187.48 -174.17 
   (171.43) (176.55) (140.31) (313.51) 
Fathers' number of kids  64.10** 61.68** 53.89+ 61.13* 
   (20.55) (20.41) (32.75) (29.26) 
Fathers' intelligence (WAIS_R)  22.00+ 19.10 47.11** -5.61 
   (12.54) (12.54) (18.02) (15.27) 
Race/Ethnicity (versus White)      
   Black  -274.01* -203.78+ 4.60 -350.91* 
   (123.01) (121.47) (140.16) (172.68) 
   Hispanic  -212.61 -130.34 55.58 -252.24 
   (144.62) (132.31) (140.65) (195.60) 
   Other  -278.64 -183.33 231.51 -586.12* 
   (209.94) (196.58) (280.87) (235.11) 
Depressive Symptom (CIDI)   66.31 58.60 4.50 103.25 
   (94.98) (94.49) (105.78) (100.97) 
Baseline Relationship Status  
(versus Nonresident)      
   Cohabitation  -46.58 -40.64 — — 
   (78.68) (72.49)   
   Married  -298.04** -225.12* — — 
   (102.61) (107.71)   
Fathers in jail  198.74+ 207.27+ 332.78** 135.26 
   (118.66) (113.11) (120.28) (124.96) 
State poverty rate  -37.37 46.15 114.60 -77.98 
   (46.64) (79.08) (94.54) (120.29) 
State unemployment rate  28.67 -25.19 -0.30 -40.92 
   (43.40) (93.52) (85.88) (99.97) 
People born in the United States  34.94 -88.10 -110.62 -48.99 
   (42.96) (80.71) (127.19) (183.44) 
children in single parent families  -14.32 -7.81 31.68 -56.35 
   (34.66) (58.28) (68.17) (71.57) 
people who went to college  -69.81 70.29 115.20 6.24 
   (43.50) (102.51) (114.12) (137.11) 
State Fixed Effects N N Y Y Y 
Interview Year Fixed Effects N N Y Y Y 
Observations 9,509 9,509 9,509 4,465 5,044 
Note: Results are presented as marginal effects on the expected value for arrearage outcomes for both censored and 
uncensored observations. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 





Table 3. Moderating Effects of Performance Measure on the Relationship Between a Number of 
Years Since the Child Support Orders were Established and the Accumulation of Arrears: Based 
on Tobit Analysis. 
Panel 1: For current collection measure  
 
 
Changes from the Mean to +1SD 
(from .60 to .69) 
 







Elapsed Time at     
 1 year 25.59 25.10 26.29  
  (54.31) (61.60) (59.77)  
 3 years -242.90+ -357.34* -125.66  
  (136.54) (159.30) (151.22)  
 5 years -918.23** -1,407.37*** -505.98  
  (304.37) (392.92) (332.24)  
 7 years -2,034.07*** -3,251.40*** -1,121.17+  
  (555.31) (758.91) (594.08)  
  
Panel 2: For arrearage collection measure  
  Change from the Mean to +1SD 
(from .60 to .64) 
 







Elapsed Time at     
 1 year -5.51 -38.92 10.62  
  (42.61) (70.33) (52.47)  
 3 years -193.08+ -353.80 -88.27  
  (103.61) (220.53) (123.84)  
 5 years -637.87** -1,123.81* -328.17  
  (220.52) (523.86) (256.82)  
 7 years -1,356.21*** -2,415.23* -713.07  
  (391.80) (964.79) (446.83)  






















Changes from the Mean to +1SD 








2SLS- 1st Stage 
 Effect of standardized 
expenditure on 
current collection 
.12* .10+ .14** 
 (.039) (.050) (.042) 
2SLS- 2nd Stage 
     Elapsed Time at    
   1 year 51.129 48.687 54.033 
  (139.952) (155.730) (176.405) 
   3 years -233.651 -368.628 -95.051 
  (299.710) (343.019) (378.834) 
   5 years -981.376+ -1,551.896* -499.821 
  (539.770) (644.361) (676.783) 
   7 years -2,233.861** -3,649.664*** -1,174.725 
  (830.352) (1,020.634) (1,026.901) 





Figure 1. Distribution of Mothers Against the Amount of Arrears Owed by the Fathers.  





















Figure 3. The Marginal Effects of Elapsed Time Since the Establishment of Child Support 
Orders on an Accumulation of Child Support Arrears Stratified by CSPIA’s Performance 
Measures 
Panel 1: For current collection measure 
 







Appendix 1. Measurement Errors on the Dependent and Explanatory Variable 















Appendix 2. CSPIA Performance Measure for Current and Arrearage Collection 
Performance Measure How to measure 
Percent of Current Collection Amount of current support collected in IV − D
Amount of current support owed in IV − D
 
Percent of Arrearage Cases Number of cases paying towards arrears in IV − D 





Appendix 3-1.CSPIA Performance Measure by Years Across States: Arrearage Collection 
 
ST 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
State 
Average 
IL 0.326 0.488 0.508 0.523 0.514 0.582 0.459 0.513 0.537 0.592 0.626 0.613 0.523 
MI 0.343 0.600 0.582 0.608 0.590 0.556 0.532 0.543 0.554 0.567 0.595 0.571 0.553 
TN 0.466 0.479 0.497 0.545 0.573 0.592 0.600 0.606 0.594 0.609 0.599 0.575 0.561 
IN 0.439 0.514 0.511 0.526 0.548 0.562 0.580 0.588 0.596 0.642 0.647 0.641 0.566 
CA 0.598 0.534 0.563 0.549 0.554 0.549 0.560 0.565 0.571 0.591 0.594 0.603 0.569 
VA 0.520 0.542 0.565 0.564 0.575 0.574 0.578 0.581 0.585 0.596 0.583 0.605 0.572 
NY 0.370 0.598 0.607 0.604 0.598 0.591 0.590 0.588 0.600 0.612 0.606 0.592 0.580 
MA 0.519 0.553 0.570 0.583 0.604 0.588 0.579 0.585 0.593 0.621 0.620 0.607 0.585 
MD 0.575 0.599 0.606 0.643 0.624 0.621 0.639 0.637 0.623 0.629 0.636 0.616 0.620 
WI 0.620 0.660 0.617 0.611 0.620 0.643 0.642 0.590 0.605 0.620 0.618 0.621 0.622 
NJ 0.607 0.562 0.585 0.612 0.656 0.633 0.632 0.638 0.639 0.657 0.659 0.624 0.625 
OH 0.563 0.579 0.418 0.675 0.663 0.663 0.665 0.673 0.671 0.682 0.665 0.640 0.630 
TX 0.633 0.634 0.630 0.645 0.623 0.635 0.652 0.673 0.673 0.686 0.666 0.645 0.650 
FL 0.799 0.818 0.750 0.628 0.646 0.658 0.667 0.637 0.599 0.623 0.604 0.599 0.669 
PA 0.639 0.673 0.697 0.707 0.715 0.710 0.735 0.752 0.758 0.788 0.818 0.831 0.735 
Year 








1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
State 
Average 
IL 0.405 0.400 0.410 0.424 0.452 0.480 0.493 0.504 0.515 0.528 0.534 0.560 0.475 
MI 0.146 0.442 0.468 0.485 0.505 0.510 0.528 0.538 0.548 0.566 0.575 0.583 0.491 
TN 0.516 0.365 0.376 0.391 0.470 0.492 0.533 0.518 0.531 0.554 0.580 0.579 0.492 
IN 0.446 0.449 0.483 0.504 0.537 0.547 0.554 0.557 0.558 0.540 0.526 0.519 0.519 
CA 0.486 0.499 0.521 0.564 0.564 0.567 0.567 0.544 0.518 0.524 0.520 0.522 0.533 
VA 0.537 0.565 0.582 0.590 0.597 0.600 0.609 0.616 0.620 0.626 0.621 0.620 0.598 
NY 0.501 0.651 0.620 0.599 0.577 0.585 0.605 0.623 0.634 0.645 0.636 0.634 0.609 
MA 0.660 0.672 0.603 0.594 0.557 0.602 0.605 0.614 0.622 0.620 0.624 0.625 0.616 
MD 0.569 0.585 0.603 0.620 0.632 0.618 0.631 0.642 0.638 0.646 0.649 0.645 0.623 
WI 0.547 0.587 0.636 0.597 0.609 0.626 0.638 0.654 0.664 0.668 0.676 0.679 0.632 
NJ 0.616 0.631 0.646 0.650 0.650 0.649 0.653 0.656 0.657 0.657 0.635 0.651 0.646 
OH 0.700 0.736 0.766 0.651 0.647 0.647 0.651 0.649 0.656 0.663 0.670 0.669 0.676 
TX 0.711 0.664 0.680 0.668 0.673 0.679 0.690 0.691 0.689 0.688 0.674 0.666 0.681 
FL 0.771 0.766 0.785 0.727 0.677 0.676 0.690 0.706 0.706 0.707 0.706 0.706 0.719 
PA 0.652 0.666 0.716 0.747 0.748 0.744 0.747 0.746 0.780 0.789 0.813 0.832 0.748 
Year 





Appendix 4. Proof of Why Two-Stage Least Squares has Larger Variance than Least Squares. 





























When a child lives in a single-parent household, a nonresident parent (usually a father) is 
obligated to provide financial assistance to the resident parent who lives with the child. Since the 
enactment of the Child Support Enforcement Act of 1975, the federal government continued to 
strengthen its effort in collecting child support payments from noncustodial fathers (Pirog & 
Ziol-Guest, 2006). Nonetheless, the level of noncompliance remains high: the Office of Child 
Support Enforcement (OCSE) reports that as of 2011, the child support debt grew to over $110 
billion nationally. Although the OCSE collected and distributed approximately $7 billion of 
these arrears in 2010, 11.3 million child support cases still had arrears remaining (OCSE, 2011). 
Without a doubt, the child support debt is damaging to the state economy (Bartfeld, 2003; 
Heinrich, Burkhardt, & Shager, 2011; Sorensen, Sousa, & Schaner, 2007).  
In addition, child support debt may have unintended consequences for both nonresident 
fathers and their children. A growing body of research has raised concerns that child support 
debts are detrimental to custodial mothers and children because they fail to receive much needed-
income (Bartfeld, 2005; Bartfeld & Meyer, 2003; Sorensen et al., 2007). Recent studies have 
also demonstrated the negative impact of child support debt on nonresident fathers’ labor force 
participation (Miller & Mincy, 2012) and their involvement with children (Turner & Waller, 
2017). However, previous studies have neglected to explore other significant consequences of 
the debt, particularly the impact on fathers’ mental health outcomes, such as depression and 
anxiety.  
Depression is an important cause of work absenteeism, loss of productivity, and even 
mortality (Henderson, Harvey, Ø verland, Mykletun, & Hotopf, 2011; Mykletun et al., 2007).  





(Bostwick & Pankratz, 2000), which is expected to be higher among untreated persons. Anxiety, 
as is usually comorbid with depression, is responsible for a marked impairment in quality of life, 
reduction in social and occupational functioning (Greenberg et al., 1999; Kessler & Greenberg, 
2002; Sherbourne, Wells, Meredith, Jackson, & Camp, 1996). Both depression and anxiety are 
typically recurrent and chronic, causing a significant financial burden associated with the use of 
medical resources (Fostick, Silberman, Beckman, Spivak, & Amital, 2010; Greenberg et al., 
1999). The inability to repay debts would cause falling further behind in paying off child support 
debt, resulting in more severe depressive symptoms among impacted fathers. Indeed, the last 
victim of this vicious cycle would be the children who have not received any support from their 
nonresident fathers.  
Despite some qualitative studies showing that the accumulation of large child support 
debt may be adversely affecting the mental health of nonresident fathers (Lin, 2000; Waller & 
Plotnick, 2001), there have been few quantitative studies on this relationship. Using previously 
unavailable data of fathers’ mental health outcomes from the Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing Study (FFCWS), the current study estimates whether the nonresident fathers with 
child support debts are at risk for the development of mental health problems. Since the data do 
not provide enough information about whether the father meets anxiety disorder criteria after 3-
year follow-up survey, the study uses an alcohol abuse problem as an alternative outcome, given 
the evidence that both anxiety and alcohol problems have a shared comorbid condition with 
common underlying risk factors (Brady & Lydiard, 1993; Kushner, 1996; Kushner, Abrams, & 
Borchardt, 2000). Another goal of this paper is to investigate whether the presence of social 
support from friends and family can buffer or protect the fathers from the negative consequences 





II.   POLICY CONTEXT 
 Child support debts appear at the final stage of the child support enforcement process. 
When a couple is divorced or separated, a child support order must be set by state child support 
guidelines. Before the enactment of the Child Support Enforcement Act of 1975, family court 
judges had the discretion to decide the amount of child support owed. The problem with this 
method is that judicial discretion can sometimes be unfair, unreasonable, and even arbitrary, and 
therefore, the nonresident father may not be willing to comply with his obligations (Pirog &  
Ziol-Guest, 2006). The presence of judicial discretion was the major cause of child support debt 
until the enactment of the Family Security Act of 1988. This Act required judges to report a 
statement of reasons if the amount of child support owed deviated from the guidelines. To 
enforce this law, each state had to explore a variety of potential guidelines that could apply to 
their specific situation. There are three different types of child support guidelines including; 
income shares, percentage of income, and Melson Formula model. All three guidelines take into 
account the incomes of either or both parents when determining the amount of the child support 
award.  
The amount of the child support award can be modified if fathers’ ability to pay child 
support changes (Ha, Cancian, & Meyer, 2010). However, having a child support order modified 
sometimes takes a longer period of time than many low-income fathers expect. A father 
interviewed in Mincy et al.  (2014) claimed that he could not get his child support order modified 
because the mother of his child did not appear in court at the time of the modification hearing. 
Another father who had fluctuating income had difficulty modifying the orders because he could 
not take a day off to attend court (Mincy et al., 2014). The problem is that the child support debts 





detrimental to incarcerated fathers who usually do not have the means to pay the debts (Holzer, 
Offner, & Sorensen, 2005; Pearson, 2004). Further compounding the problem is that most of 
these low-income fathers are ignorant of the conditions under which they are eligible to apply for 
the modification (Hatamyar, 2000).  
A nonresident father may also be less likely to allocate income to child support when his 
children receive less money than expected (Beller & Graham, 1996). For instance, a father with 
children on welfare might be reluctant to comply with child support obligations, knowing that 
the contributions to the child will instead be used to recoup government expenditures on welfare 
costs (Waller & Plotnick, 2001). To address this issue, the Child Support Amendments of 1984 
required states to pass through $50 of the child support payment to the custodial parent on 
welfare, and disregard this amount for determining the welfare grant. The main purpose of this 
policy was to give the child support obligors an incentive to use the formal child support 
program by cooperating with the local enforcement agencies. However, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWORA) modified the pass-through and 
disregard policies, and now states can either keep all the child support received to recover 
welfare expenditures or pass all or part of the payments to custodial mothers. Another 
groundbreaking government effort in collecting child support includes automatic wage 
withholding for delinquent obligors. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 
mandated wage withholding for every noncustodial father with arrears, resulting in an increase in 
child support collections from the fathers (Garfinkel & Klawitter, 1990). The automatic wage 






Despite remarkable success in collecting child support from nonresident fathers, the level 
of unpaid child support remains high, especially among low-income fathers. According to a 
recent study based on nine large states, fathers who make less than $10,000 per year owed two-
thirds of total child support debt, and each of these “high debtors” owed more than $30,000 
(Sorensen et al., 2007). The greater the amount of debt, the less likely the father will participate 
in the formal labor market because the debt would lower the effective wage (Beller & Graham, 
1996). If the father cannot work, then there are fewer chances to pay-off child support debts, and 
as a result, the debts are more likely to snowball. Therefore, the nonresident fathers with high 
arrears will continue to fall further behind regarding the repayment of their debts  (Miller & 
Mincy, 2012; Pate, 2002).  
A large body of research indicates that accumulation of arrears is, in part, the result of 
state-level enforcement policies (Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2014; Sorensen, 2004; 
Sorensen, Koball, Pomper, & Zibman, 2003; Sorensen et al., 2007). Sorensen and colleagues 
(2007) found that states that assessed interest on a routine basis had higher arrears growth rate 
than other states between the 1990s and 2000s. A report from the Institute for Research on 
Poverty (Bartfeld, 2003) yielded consistent results indicating that nearly 50 percent of total debts 
were attributable to the state-level policies. In addition, some punitive enforcement actions, such 
as tax refund intercepts, asset seizures, and professional license revocations, do not result in 
increased child support collection, but instead make it hard for low-income fathers to work in the 
formal labor market (Mincy & Sorensen, 1998; Sorensen et al., 2007).  
To reduce the accumulation of child support debts, state and local governments had 





(CSPIA) 16 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011). There are two approaches to reduce 
the debts: one is to prevent the further accumulation of debt, and the other is to reduce the 
existing debt (Bartfeld & Meyer, 2003; Sorensen et al., 2007). The underlying philosophy of the 
debt reduction programs is to help noncustodial parents pay off their current child support debts 
by using state resources so that they can continue to comply with child support obligations in the 
future. Several states, including Wisconsin, Colorado, and California, have reported that such 
debt reduction programs have reduced child support debt burdens for nonresident fathers and 
increased the receipt of child support (California Department of Child Support Service, 2008; 
Heinrich et al., 2011; Pearson & Davis, 2002).  
III.  THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Stress Process Model as a Theoretical Framework 
The obligation to repay debts usually comes with a feeling of shame and guilt, resulting 
in low self-esteem (Dwyer, McCloud, & Hodson, 2011). Likewise, child support debt may erode 
the father’s sense of self-concept because it hampers future consumption, and increases feelings 
of impotence. A sociological perspective suggests that a sense of self-concept is a potential 
resource that can protect mental health from detrimental life events such as economic hardship 
and indebtedness (Kessler & Essex, 1982; Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Pudrovska, Schieman, 
Pearlin, & Nguyen, 2005). Thus, fathers with child support debts may become frustrated and as a 
result, have a high risk of depression and anxiety.  
                                                          
16 According to CSPIA, the federal government is required to provide an incentive to the states 
that perform well based on National Child Support Goals measured by five performance 
indicators: arrearage collection, paternity establishment, order establishment, current collection, 





In recent years, research on mental health outcomes associated with personal debt has 
been guided by the stress process model (Drentea & Lavrakas, 2000; Drentea & Reynolds, 
2015). The stress process model, proposed by Pearlin and his colleagues (Pearlin, 1999; Pearlin, 
Menaghan, Lieberman, & Mullan, 1981), consists of three interactive conceptual components:  
(1) stressors, (2) moderating resources, and (3) stress outcomes. The underlying assumption of 
this model is that stressors are shaped by the socioeconomic contexts associated with a father’s 
mental health outcomes. Therefore, complex genetic mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, are 
usually not used as outcomes in the stress process model (Aneshensel, 1992).  
 The stressors include those events that occur at a personal or family level that are either 
acute or may have chronic consequences. One’s indebtedness is a money-related stressor that 
could lead directly to changes in the individual’s level of depression or delinquent behaviors (see 
Panel 1 in Figure 1). For instance, fathers with a large accumulation of arrears may have to face 
many uncomfortable or distressing factors. They may have to cut down their regular household 
expenditures, such as food or housing, to pay their overdue debts. Because of an inability to 
make ends meet due to a heavy arrears burden, fathers may experience serious psychological 
distress (Murray, 2010). 
 In addition, Pearlin and many stress researchers posit that life stressors can be alleviated 
by the presence of one’s social support that is disproportionally distributed across social groups 
(See Panel 2 in Figure 1). The term “social support” refers to the extent to which individuals can 
access financial and emotional support, or both, in the form of relationships (Cohen & Wills, 
1985; Johnson & Sarason, 1978; Pearlin, 1999). In the stress process model, social support is a 
coping device that helps fathers deal with distress caused by financial strain. For instance, when 





through difficult times. Therefore, if the father receives social support from his friends and 
family, his chances of developing mental health problems in response to a stressor will decrease.  
Debts and Mental Health among General Population 
A large body of literature suggests that financial indebtedness or an increase in debt may 
create a higher risk of stress-related mental health problems, such as anxiety, depression, and 
substance abuse (Bridges & Disney, 2010). The evidence of a causal link between individual 
debts and mental health is prevalent across western countries. Using data from 17 European 
countries between 1995 and 2012, Clayton, Liñares-Zegarra, and Wilson (2015) have shown that 
accumulated household debts are an important factor for negative health outcomes across 
countries. This finding is in line with earlier work by Fitch, Hamilton, Bassett and, Davey (2011) 
who conducted a systematic review of the relationship between personal debt and mental health 
in the English-language and peer-reviewed literature between 1980 and 2009. Among the 50 
selected papers, a large number of studies found significant relationships between debt and 
mental health (Clayton et al., 2015). Consistent with this study, a meta-analysis recently 
published in clinical psychology examined data from 65 studies and found the relationship 
between debts and mental health. The study suggested that the likelihood of having a mental 
disorder is more than three times higher among people in debt (Richardson, Elliott, & Roberts, 
2013). Meltzer and his colleagues further expanded this idea and found that the situation was 
more detrimental among those with addictive behaviors, such as alcohol or drug dependence 
(Meltzer, Bebbington, Brugha, Farrell, & Jenkins, 2013).  
A growing number of studies have been addressing debt-related issues that have emerged 





debt, credit card debt, and student loans17 are three major reasons Americans fall into economic 
hardship. Over the past two decades, media reports about the adverse mental health 
consequences of financial debts have increased significantly, leading many researchers to 
investigate the effects of indebtedness across different groups (Jacoby, 2002). Drentea and 
Lavrakas (2000) examined the effect of credit card debt on health problems. Using a random 
telephone survey in Ohio in 1997, they found that credit card debt has a stronger effect than 
income on stress-related health outcomes and risky behaviors, and the effects are stronger for 
Blacks than other racial groups. Reading and Reynolds (2001) focused on maternal depression 
among women who have children less than one year of age. Using self-reported data collected 
from families with young children, however, they found that debt concerns were not 
independently associated with depressive symptoms measured six months later.  
There are several potential confounders to the association between indebtedness and 
mental health outcomes. Dreatea (2000) argued that younger adults are more anxious about debts 
because anxiety tends to decrease with age (Schieman, 1999). Depression, on the other hand, is 
less likely among young adults (Mirowsky & Ross, 1992). According to Dwyer and colleagues 
(2011), young adults are less stressed out from the credit card or other debts than older adults 
because they tend to view those debts as future investments. Another confounder of the 
association between indebtedness and mental health is the debt burden (Meltzer et al., 2013). 
Zimmerman and Katon (2005) showed that depression was highly associated with income among 
                                                          
17 Total U.S. household debt hit a record high in the first quarter of 2017. According to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2017), Americans have more than $9 trillion in mortgage 
debt and nearly $4 trillion in student loan and credit card debt combined. Americans owe more 
than $60,000 per person in household debt, which is the third largest amount of debt per capita 
among OECD countries after Japan and Ireland (OECD, 2017). Households’ ability to maintain 
debt has been declining since the recession began, as the ratio of debt to disposable income drops 





low-income male. The result suggests that the greater the burden of debt, the higher the degree of 
depression.   
Child Support and Mental Health Problems among Low-Income Fathers 
Low-income nonresident fathers may have a higher risk of mental health problems than 
other fathers (DeKlyen, Brooks-Gunn, McLanahan, & Knab, 2006). One possible reason may be 
related to the strictness of the child support enforcement system. Many noncustodial fathers with 
high levels of child support debt find it hard to comply with child support obligations. According 
to qualitative research conducted by Waller and Plotnick (2001), a large amount of child support 
debt is often described as burdensome and overwhelming for low-income noncustodial fathers. 
Many noncustodial father respondents to the study could not pay off child support debts, despite 
allocating more than half of their income to child support payments (Waller & Plotnick, 2001). 
To quote a father interviewed in Sherwood’s qualitative study(1992) introduced by Waller and 
Plotnick (2001), this high level of child support debt is “what’s killing us.”  
Kimberly Turner and Maureen Waller’s study (2017) is the only empirical research that 
explored the link between child support arrears and fathers’ mental health, although the study 
was originally designed to test the mediating effects of mental health on a relationship between 
child support arrears and father involvement. Nevertheless, they found that an accumulation of 
child support debt at a high level creates an increased risk for depressive symptoms among 
nonresident fathers whose noncustodial child was aged 9. However, the potential threat 
associated with endogeneity arising from simultaneity is of concern as the link between child 
support and mental health was cross-sectional. That is, the mental health problems of the father 





support arrears may result in biased estimates of the effect of the debts on fathers’ mental health 
outcomes.  
Based on the stress-process model and the extant literature, the present study tests the  
following three hypotheses:  
H1: Child support debt will be positively associated with fathers’ poor mental health outcomes. 
H2: The effect of having child support debt on mental health outcomes will be stronger for 
fathers with high debt burdens than those with low debt burdens. 
H3: The existence of social support moderates the relationship between child support debt and 
the risk of mental health problems among nonresident fathers. 
IV.  DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data Set 
 The analysis of the current study uses 3,099 repeated observations (1,606 unique 
observations) of fathers who were not deceased or unknown but were not living with the mother 
of the focal child at some point since the one-and nine-year follow-up survey. From the 4,898 
unique observations at the baseline survey, 183 cases are excluded because fathers were 
deceased or unknown between baseline and year-nine follow-up, and 407 cases are excluded 
because fathers had custody, yielding 4,308 unique observations. Of these, 1,982 fathers (46%) 
who remain resident between one and nine-year follow-up are excluded from the sample. An 
additional 720 unique observations are dropped because the father was not interviewed at three- 
five- and nine-year follow-up; yielding the final observations of 1,606.  
 For the dynamic model, I pool the sample across three-, five-, and nine-year surveys 
when the father’s mental health outcomes were measured, yielding a pooled sample of 3,099. 





year follow-up, and 944 cases from the 9-year follow-up survey. Missing data on a dependent 
variable is included in the imputation process but is later excluded from the analytic sample, the 
method recommended by Von Hippel (2007), yielding 3,088 repeated observations (1,603 
unique observations) for the depression outcome and 2,886 observations (1,546 unique 
observations) for the binge drinking outcome. The differences in demographic characteristics 
between the two repeated samples are minimal.  
Compared to the core sample of Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS) at 
baseline, the study sample includes a larger proportion of fathers with lower educational 
attainment, more likely to born in the United States, and more African American and fewer 
White fathers. The study sample also includes a smaller proportion of fathers who work in full-
time jobs and whose child’s mother are financially independent. In short, the analytic sample is 
comprised of fathers who are relatively vulnerable to financial shocks. This is not surprising, 
given that the sample is restricted to nonresident fathers who appear to be more economically 
vulnerable than their resident father counterparts (Mincy et al., 2014).  
Variables  
 Paternal depression  
As shown in the literature review, paternal depression is an important dimension of 
mental health outcomes. Based on the World Health Organization’s Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview-Short Form (CIDI-SF) (Kessler, Andrews, Mroczek, Ustun, & Wittchen, 
1998), paternal depression is measured by fathers’ direct reports at the one-, three-, five- and 
nine-year follow-up surveys of the FFCWS. Fathers were asked whether they had been feeling 
sad, blue, depressed, or were losing interest in things that were usually pleasurable in the past 





more specific questions. These included whether they were: 1) losing interest, 2) feeling tired, 3) 
gain or lose in weight, 4) trouble falling asleep 5) trouble concentrating, 6) feeling down, and 7) 
thinking about death. Each item score used in the study is summed, leading to a depression score 
range of 0-7. Using this depression score, I predict the probability of being in a CIDI depression 
category among fathers who endorse diagnostic stem questions. As revealed by Kessler et al. 
(1982), individuals with a probability of more than 0.5 in the CIDI depression category or those 
with a depression score of 3 or higher are expected to have a major depressive disorder. The 
current study uses a dichotomous measure of the major depressive symptoms based on the 
Kessler et al.’s method described above. To control for non-random selection into arrearage 
status, the study introduces a measure of prior paternal depression.18  
Alcohol abuse problem  
The study examines self-reported fathers’ alcohol abuse problem in the one-, three-, five- 
and nine-follow-up surveys of the FFCWS based on the Alcohol and Drug Dependence scales 
derived from the World Health Organization’s CIDI-SF (Kessler et al., 1998). Fathers will be 
considered as having an alcohol problem if they have at least five or more drinks in a single day 
in the last twelve months (dichotomous outcomes). The study includes a measure of prior alcohol 
dependence from the previous wave to control for an earlier level of alcohol use. 19  
 Stress exposure: child support arrears 
Following the method used by Miller and Mincy (2012), the current study constructs two 
measures of child support arrears at the three- five- and nine-year follow-up surveys. One is a 
binary measure taking the value of 1 if the fathers have ever had a child support debt, and 0 
                                                          
18 Note that the depression variable measured at the one-year follow-up survey is used only for the lagged 
dependent variable). 
19 Note that the alcohol abuse problem variable measured at the one-year follow-up survey is used only 





otherwise. The other is a categorical measure constructed by taking the ratio of the amount of 
arrears to fathers’ income (0= no arrears, 1=1-50%: low arrears burden, 2= 50% or above: high 
arrears burden). Both income and arrears are adjusted to 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index. Because of the high proportion of missing data for the father-reported arrears variables, 
the study uses the data reported by their child’s mother. The mothers were asked if the father has 
any arrears that he is supposed to pay to the mothers or to the government. For those who did not 
report arrears but established child support orders, I assumed that the amount of arrears is 
equivalent to the difference between the amount of child support owed and the amount received. 
I also assumed that the amount of arrears is zero for fathers who complied with child support 
obligations in full.  
 It is evident that mothers are likely to report the father’s child support debts with errors. 
For example, as Miller and Mincy (2012) pointed out, mothers may under-report the actual 
amount of arrears owed by fathers because they have little information about the unpaid amount 
of child support owed to children of different mothers. In this case, it is difficult to make an 
accurate estimate of arrears unless there is administrative data for child support. However, if a 
case, other than the missing cases, is directly related to the mother, she may over-report on the 
father’s arrears. Much of past research on child support has suffered from inaccurate information 
about payments and orders reported by both mothers and fathers. For instance, there is evidence 
supporting the notion that mothers tend to over-report noncustodial fathers’ obligations to 
support their children, whereas fathers tend to under-report their obligations (Braver, Fitzpatrick, 
& Bay, 1991). This evidence is consistent with the results from the FFCWS data where the 
father’s reports on the proportion of arrears that he owes to the mother or the government were 





key independent variable may induce a downward bias in the estimates of the effect of arrears on 
mental health outcomes. The study has attempted to address this limitation using an instrumental 
variable approach, as described below.  
Moderator: social support 
Social support refers to a range of assistance individuals could get from friends and 
family if needed (Cohen & Hoberman, 1983). In particular, when one becomes a parent, she or 
he may need extra financial help from others. I assume that a person who can help the father 
financially can also provide him with emotional support and make him feel less stressed about 
his child support debt. To measure the social support, I created a dichotomous measure to 
indicate whether a father had received social support from the following question: “Since the 
child was born, have you received any financial help or money from anyone other than mother?” 
The support includes fathers’ relatives and friends but does not include help from any 
government or private agency.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for dependent and key explanatory variables. Of 
the fathers in the analytic sample (N=3,099), only 13.7% of them experienced depression at 1-
year follow-up survey, slightly declining to 12% at 3-year and 5-year, but rising again to 14.5% 
by 9-year. In the 1-year follow-up survey, only 10% of fathers were engaged in binge drinking, 
but this proportion had increased to 35.3% of fathers by 9-year. As expected, the proportion of 
fathers who owe child support arrears had continued to increase over time since childbirth (from 
10.2% at 1-year follow-up to 34.9% at 9-year follow-up survey).  As time passes since the 
childbirth, a higher proportion of nonresident fathers had accumulated arrears burdens that 





debts that were more than 50 percent of their income, but this proportion increased to 9.7% of 
fathers by 9-year.  
Control variables 
The study accounts for the selection into nonresident fatherhood by controlling for a large 
number of individual-and state-level characteristics. The study first controls for a number of 
time-invariant socioeconomic characteristics of fathers reported by the father at the time of the 
baby’s birth. The study also adjusts for a set of time-varying covariates measured at each survey 
year. 
 Fathers’ self-reported educational attainment at the time of birth is measured as a four-
category scale: less than high school (reference), high school diploma, some college, and college 
graduate. Fathers’ race/ethnicity is measured by a set of dummy variables for non-Hispanic 
White (reference), non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and other race. Fathers’ nativity is coded as a 
dummy variable, with 1 indicating whether the father was born in the United States. Fathers’ age 
and age squared are measured in years at the time of birth. To measure fathers’ cognitive 
functioning, the study uses the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R), a single 
most widely used instrument in measuring cognitive developments for young adults. The score 
for this variable ranges from 0 to 15, where 15 means “very intelligent.” Fathers’ health at the 
time of birth is represented by a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Great) to 5 (Poor).  
 The study includes three pieces of information relating to the relationship quality between 
mothers and fathers: (1) absence of a father’s name on the birth certificate (1=No, 0=Yes); (2) 
fathers’ number of children with other mothers at the time of baby’s birth; and (3) whether 
fathers asked the mother to have an abortion (1=Yes, 0=No). For the measure of mothers’ 





mothers have unemployment insurance, disability insurance, or social security; and (2) whether 
the mothers receive money from friends and family. The study includes two pieces of 
information about the child: (1) gender (1=Male, 2=Female), and (2) low-birth weight (1=baby 
less than 2,500 grams, 0=baby more than or equal to 2,500 grams).  
To account for the initial value problem in the dynamic Probit model, the study includes 
five sets of dummy variables indicating family mental health history by asking the following 
questions about the fathers’ biological father (1) he was depressed or blue most of the time; (2) 
he constantly nervous, edgy, or anxious; (3) he ever have a problem with drinking; (4) he ever 
have a problem with drugs; and (5) he ever attempt to commit suicide.  
The study also includes a set of time-varying covariates measured at each survey year: 
mother-reported relationship transition (father becoming a non-resident parent), whether the 
father was in jail at the time of the interview reported by the mother, and fathers’ self-reported 
labor force participation (1=unemployed, 2=part-time job, and 3=full-time job). Because the 
time-varying covariates may be affected by either or both arrears and mental health outcomes, 
the study will present an alternative set of estimates with lagged time-varying covariates to 
determine the robustness of the findings.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all covariates used in the study. Approximately 
20% of fathers had some college or more. 11.5% of fathers were non-Hispanic White, 64.7% 
were non-Hispanic Black, and 20.8% were Hispanic. On average, these fathers were in their mid-
20s at the time of the baby’s birth and more than 90% of them were born in the U.S. Most fathers 
were healthy and had their name on the birth certificate. On average, these fathers had 2.134 
children with other women before the focal child was born. Only 11.6% of fathers asked the 





received income from friends and family members. Slightly more than half of the children were 
boys, and only 10% of them were of low birthweight. Less than a quarter of fathers had a 
biological father who suffered from mental health disorders. Forty percent of fathers received 
social support from friends and families when the baby was born.  
In regard to time-varying covariates, most fathers become nonresident when the child 
was five years old the results of which are consistent with the findings of Halpern and Turney 
(2000). Thirteen percent of fathers have been in jail at mothers’ 3- and 5-year interview, 
declining to 8.1% at 9-year interview. Most noncustodial fathers work in full-time jobs during 
survey years.  
Missing Data 
 The presence of non-random attrition can cause a serious bias in estimating the causal 
link between treatment and outcomes. In this paper, less than 15 percent of the 3,099 cases have 
missing information on any study variables. Because of a large number of variables with missing 
data, the study uses multiple imputation using chained equation (MICE), the most advanced 
imputation technique in social science so far. Unlike other imputation techniques, MICE uses 
multiple complete data sets with multiple times to impute missingness. To use this method, three 
consecutive processes are needed. First, the missing values are replaced in m times, in this 
study’s case 5 times, to generate complete data sets. Next, these multiply imputed data sets are 
analyzed by using a separate imputation model for each variable to generate complete data. 
Lastly, combine the results of the complete data set and run the previous three steps multiple 
times (5 times in this study).  
 There are three advantages of using the MICE technique. First, MICE can use model 





did not establish child support orders, he skipped questions related to child support arrears. With 
this skip-pattern in mind, imputation models with restriction ensure that missing values on child 
support arrears would not be imputed for those fathers who did not establish child support orders. 
Next, the MICE assumes that the missing data should follow a missing at random mechanism, 
which is not a strong assumption because the study has a large number of covariates that may 
provide more information about the missing data. Lastly, the confidence intervals of the study 
results will have correct coverage properties, as MICE addresses more types of uncertainties 
about the missing values than any other imputation technique. For instance, the regression 
imputation approach assumes that the coefficients taken from the points on the regression line 
are considered a true value. The MICE approach, on the other hands, is skeptical of this 
assumption due to the uncertainty of the model’s parameter. To address this type of uncertainty, 
MICE draws the coefficient values from an appropriate distribution, a normal distribution in case 
of this study, instead of assuming that the values are true. 
V.   ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
The main objective of this study is to test whether nonresident fathers who owe child 
support arrears are at risk for the development of mental health and alcohol abuse problems.  Our 
theory predicts that fathers with a history of mental health problems are likely to fall into 
financial difficulties, which may later have a more significant impact on severe mental illness. 
Therefore, failure to control for the previous mental health status may overstate the impact of 
child support debt on current mental health problems. To address these concerns, the study 
includes a lagged dependent variable (whether father had mental health/alcohol abuse problems 
at the previous wave) as a covariate to reduce a possible omitted variable bias. Another 





effects – the effect that accounts for the previous level of the dependent variable.20 This method, 
also known as the “dynamic Probit model” can be estimated only from the longitudinal data set.   
The specification for the dynamic Probit model is as follows: 
 
𝑃 (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|(𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖, 𝜇𝑖, )) = 
Φ (𝜏𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛼 + 𝜔𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖) 
(1) 
Where i = 1, …, N for each individual in the panel, and t refers to the time period, either wave 3 
(3-year follow-up), wave 4 (5-year follow-up), or wave 5 (9-year follow-up). The dependent 
variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, is defined as a dummy variable indicating whether father i has mental or alcohol 
abuse problems at time t. As previously mentioned, I include the fathers’ previous history of 
mental or alcohol abuse problems, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−121, to account for the autoregressive effect. The 
coefficient of the autoregressive parameter,𝛾, indicates the extent to which a predisposition to 
mental/alcohol abuse problems in the previous survey year is transmitted to mental/alcohol abuse 
problems in the current survey year. 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is defined in two alternative ways: either a dummy 
variable indicating whether father i has accumulated child support arrears at time t or the ratio of 
arrears to earnings. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝜔𝑖 are vectors of time-varying and time-constant covariates, 
respectively. Note that the issue of reverse causality will be discussed in a later section. Lastly, 
𝜇𝑡 is time-invariant effects representing unobserved heterogeneity that is common to father i 
across all waves (individual-specific effects).   
Although the dynamic Probit models can minimize the omitted variable bias, it cannot 
fully eliminate the possibility of such bias if the initial condition effects are neglected (Arellano 
                                                          
20 Or it can be defined as “the effect of a construct on itself measured at a later time” (Selig & Little, 
2012) 
21 t-1 t refers to the lagged time period, either wave 2 (1-year follow-up), wave 3 (3-year follow-up), or 





& Hahn, 2006; Bover & Arellano, 1997; Heckman, 1987; Wooldridge, 2005). That being said a 
potential relationship between time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, 𝜇𝑖, in Eq 1 and fathers’ 
past mental health status, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, can lead to a significant problem of the so called “initial value 
problem.” For example, mental health outcomes can be attributed not only to a combination of 
social, psychological, and economical factors, but also to unobserved personal tendencies that do 
not change over time (initial condition).  Obviously, these unobserved personal tendencies would 
affect fathers’ past mental health status, which would violate the basic assumption of random 
effects that 𝜇𝑖 should be independent of all other variables on the right-hand side (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2008). Violation of this assumption can lead to serious bias in estimates of 
autoregressive parameter and all other parameters, including 𝜏. 
Some studies have attempted to solve this problem by assuming that 𝜇𝑖 is exogenous but, 
as Heckman (1987) showed, this assumption can cause more serious bias. Instead, I use the 
approach proposed by Wooldridge (2005) who suggests that the distribution of unobserved 
effects can be modeled based on the initial dependent variable. However, since the fathers’ 
mental health problems based on the CIDI-SF were not measured at the baseline of FFCWS 
study, its initial condition for some fathers is unknown22. Instead, assuming that family’s past 
mental health history can predict one’s risks for future mental disorders and alcohol use 
problems, and those risks are assumed to remain constant over time, I specify the unobserved 
heterogeneity as a linear function of the fathers’ family mental health history (𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑖0) as 
follows: 
 𝜇𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑖0 + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
 
                                                          






 𝜇𝑖|(𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑖0 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑋𝑖𝑡) ≈ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) (3) 
Therefore, I substitute eq2 into eq1 by adding the MHS variable as an additional covariate.  This 
procedure yields the following equation: 
 
𝑃 (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|(𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖, 𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑖0, 𝜀𝑖 )) = 
Φ (𝜏𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛼 + 𝜔𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝛿𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑖0 + 𝜀𝑖) 
(4) 
The study examines three successive models by subsequently adding predictors as 
specified in Equation 1 and 4. The first model is a bivariate model predicting mental health 
outcomes based only on whether or not fathers owe child support arrears. In the subsequent 
model (Model 2), the study replicates the results of previous studies showing that mental health 
and alcohol abuse outcomes are highly correlated with an individual’s socio-economic 
characteristics.  Finally, in Model 3, the study adds the lagged dependent variable and initial 
conditions of mental health/alcohol abuse problems to Model 2. The standard errors in each 
model are clustered by year to account for unobserved temporal heterogeneities. In order to make 
the coefficients of the Probit estimation interpretable, all results are presented as marginal effects 
evaluated at the sample means.  
VI.  RESULTS 
Main Analysis 
The estimation results from the dynamic Probit model are reported in Table 3 for 
depression and Table 4 for alcohol abuse problems. It first presents a bivariate model (Model 1) 
and then a model including previously identified covariates23 (Model 2), followed by a model 
                                                          
23 The model includes a set of time-invariant socio-demographic characteristic, as well as 





including both the lagged dependent variable and the initial conditions (Model 3). In each model, 
coefficients on the dichotomous measure of child support debt are shown at the first row. The 
coefficients on the ratio of arrears to earnings measure are presented in the subsequent row. Lastly, 
the coefficients on the covariates are from the models where the dichotomous measure was used 
as a key independent variable.  
From the depression model, the study provides strong evidence that fathers who owe 
arrears are more likely to report depressive symptoms than those who do not owe any arrears. 
Model 1, the bivariate model, in the left panel of Table 3 shows that there is about 5.624 percentage 
point difference in probability of having depressive symptoms between fathers who owe child 
support debt versus fathers who do not owe any. Having a father whose ratio of debt to income is 
less than 50 percent would still be at risk for the development of depressive symptoms, but the risk 
to the father who owes child support debt of more than 50 percent of his income is still higher (5.4 
vs 8.2 percentage point). In Model 2, the results for the debt-depression relationship are robust to 
the inclusion of a rich set of covariates, although the effect size is reduced. For example, the 
magnitude of the coefficient on fathers' arrearage status is reduced by 21 percentage points 
(b=0.044, p<0.001), and a similar degree of change is also observed in fathers with low and high 
arrears burden (b=0.049, p<0.05 for low burdens; and b= 0.048, p<0.01 for high burdens, 
respectively). In Model 3, which adjusted for the lagged dependent variable and the initial 
condition, arrears coefficients are slightly reduced in magnitude (b=0.036) but remain significant 
at the 1 % level. The coefficient estimates of the lagged dependent variable can be interpreted as 
1 percentage point increase in the probability of developing depressive symptoms in previous 
                                                          
24 Note that when this result is expressed in logit form, the ratio of the probability of not having 
depressive symptom versus having depressive symptom (odd ratio) is 1.64. According to Chen et al.’s  
study (2010), the magnitude of this ratio (Odd ratio) is considered to be small as the odd ratio of 1.68 is 





survey year produces a 0.11 percentage point increase in the probability of developing depressive 
symptoms in the current survey year.  
Turning to the estimates of alcohol abuse problems, Model 1 in the right panel of Table 3 
shows that fathers with child support arrears are 6.7 percentage points more likely to develop 
alcohol problems than those without the arrears. In addition, as reported in the second row, having 
child support arrears of less than 50 percent of fathers’ income is associated with an 8.3 percentage 
point increase in the probability that fathers have drinking problems. However, the arrears 
coefficients drop by including a large set of covariates in Model 2, although the coefficient remains 
significant at the 1% level. The regression coefficients for arrears do not change substantially in 
Model 3, which adjusted for the lagged dependent variable and the initial condition. The 
coefficient estimates of the autoregressive effect imply that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
probability of having drinking problems in the previous survey year produces a 0.150 percentage 
point increase in the probability of having drinking problems in the current survey year. In sum, 
the results indicate that, compared to those who did not owe any arrears, fathers who owe arrears 
are more likely to report mental health symptoms and are more likely to have alcohol abuse 
problems. 
The findings for the control variables are generally consistent with the previous research 
on depression in adults. As shown in the second column of Table 3, fathers are more likely to 
develop mental health problems when they are unemployed, have a history of incarceration, or 
have children with other women. These factors put fathers at higher risk of depression. In addition, 
African American fathers are less likely than White fathers to develop depressive symptoms, the 
result of which is consistent with those obtained from a large number of previous studies (Assari 





Anderson, 1997). The marginal effects of the initial condition on depression are shown in the third 
column of Table 3, indicating that family mental health history is significantly associated with 
fathers’ current depression.  
The marginal effects of the control variables on the alcohol outcomes are shown in the fifth 
column of Table 3, indicating that fathers are more likely to develop alcohol problems when they 
are attached to the labor market, have no history of incarceration, or have obtained higher 
education. The finding that White fathers have a higher risk of developing alcohol dependence 
than African American fathers is not consistent with previous research in which African American 
Americans have a higher risk of alcohol dependence (Herd, 1994; Mulia, Ye, Greenfield, & 
Zemore, 2009). Part of the reason for this discrepancy is that the sample of the study consisted of 
non-resident fathers who are predominately Black and Hispanic. Therefore, the results are not 
representative of the White Americans in general.  
Heterogeneous Effects of Child Support Debt by Social Support  
 As hypothesized in the stress process model, the effects of child support debt on the 
development of depression and alcohol abuse problems may be moderated by social support. That 
is, fathers who experience more support from friends and family may be less likely to develop 
mental health and alcohol abuse problems as a result of child support debt than those who 
experience less support. To test this hypothesis, equation 5 adds an interaction term between child 
support debt and social support (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑖) to the Eq4.  
 
𝑃 (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|(𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑖, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖, 𝜇𝑖 , 𝑀𝐻𝑆𝑖0 )) = 
Φ( 𝜏𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋(𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑖) + 𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛼 + 𝜔𝑖







The interaction term represents the difference in the marginal effect of child support debt on 
outcomes between fathers with and without social support. However, unlike the linear model 
with the explicit interaction term, the marginal effect of child support arrears is not constant but 
instead depends on the arrears variable and other covariates, including the social support 
variable. Therefore, as described by Ai and Norton (2003), the coefficient of the interaction term 
in nonlinear models, such as equation (5), is not equivalent to the marginal effect calculated by 
statistical software packages, e.g. Stata. Instead, as suggested by Karaca-Mandic et al. (2012), 
table 4 shows the marginal effect of child support arrears for fathers with social support and the 
marginal effect of child support arrears for fathers without social support. Testing the hypothesis 
requires taking the difference between these two marginal effects.   
 The first two columns in Table 4 provide the results required to test the hypothesis that 
fathers without social support will be more likely to develop depressive symptoms than those 
with social support if they have child support arrears. The results support this claim. That is, 
compared to those who received social support from friends and family during childbirth, fathers 
who have not received any social support have a probability of developing depressive symptoms 
that is 3.1 (=6.0-2.9) percentage points higher when they are behind in child support payments.  
The results reported in Panel 2 are more compelling in terms of dividing fathers into sub-groups 
who owe arrears either more or less than half of their income. Fathers with a relatively low 
arrears burden do not receive much benefit from social support because it could only lower the 
probability of having depressive symptoms by 0.8 (= 5.3-4.5) percentage points. On the other 
hand, if the fathers with a relatively high arrears burden do not receive social support, the 





results in the second column show that the hypothesis is robust to the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable and the initial condition.  
 The next two columns in Table 4 provide the results required to test the hypothesis that 
fathers without social support are more likely to engage in alcohol abuse than those with social 
support if they accumulate child support arrearages. The results support this hypothesis for 
fathers who owe arrears less than half of their income.  However, the probability of having 
drinking problems is greater for fathers with high arrears burden who received social support 
from friends and family (see the results of column 3 and 4 in Panel 2). This discrepancy may be 
attributed to social drinking. Fathers with social support tend to have many close friends and 
family who involve with them and may have more chance to drink alcohol on social occasions. 
These friends and family may also offer a drink when a person is going through a financial crisis 
since alcohol is believed to relieve stress, which may cause more alcohol consumption.  
Robustness Check: Instrumental Variable Estimates 
 As indicated above, the potential measurement errors associated with mothers’ reports of 
fathers’ child support arrears can introduce a downward bias in the estimated effect of arrears on 
mental health outcomes. In addition, there is also a problem of reverse causality if the mothers’ 
reports of arrears are provided before the fathers’ reports of mental health outcomes. One might 
argue that at least the latter problem could be solved by taking the lagged value of child support 
predictor as an explanatory variable. However, this approach may cause another problem 
associated with the timing of the survey if the interval between the time when the lagged value of 
arrears was measured and the time when the mental health outcomes were measured is too long. 
For instance, some fathers reported that they did not have arrears at the 5-year-follow-up interview, 





are in the “arrears group,” but being treated as if they are in the “non-arrears group,” making the 
results less reliable.  
 To account for these two potential threats to internal validity, the study uses an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach that identifies an exogenous source of variation in child support arrears.  
The idea of this approach is to isolate the effects of arrears on mental health or alcohol abuse 
problems from other sources of variation, such as measurement error. To be valid, the instrument 
used in the analysis must satisfy two requirements: it must be associated with child support arrears 
and be related to mental health outcomes but only through its direct association with child support 
arrears. With this premise in mind, the study uses the percentage of state arrearage collections as 
an instrument for child support arrears. The arrearage collection is one of five performance 
measures designed to assess the effectiveness of a state’s child support enforcement system under 
the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998 (Huang & Edwards, 2009). The degree 
of state arrearage collection is an exogenous variable that differs across states and years. Therefore, 
changes in the percentage of state arrearage collections will affect the likelihood that the father 
owes child support debt but that does not have a direct effect on depression or alcohol abuse 
problems, except when the father suffers from debt burdens. A description of this measure is 
provided in Appendix 1. 
The study follows the three-stage procedure introduced by Adam et al. (2009), which takes 
into account the binary nature of the endogenous variable. This approach differs from a standard 
two-stage least square (2SLS) procedure, because the latter depends little on the correct 
specification of the first stage model, whereas the former has an opportunity to have the first stage 
correctly specified. Although Angrist and Kruger (2001) argue that the consistency of the second 





al. (2009) counter argue that misspecification in the first stage may contaminate the second stage 
results, yielding biased estimates of causal effects in finite samples. Despite the mixed opinions 
on the misspecification of the first stage, the current study will follow the argument of Adam et al. 
(2009).  
The first two stages of the three-stage procedure are presented in Eq6 and Eq7 respectively, 
while the functional form of the third stage is shown in Eq8.  
 
𝑃 (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1|( 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖, 𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 )) = 
Φ(𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜋 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡





 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛼 + 𝜔𝑖




𝑃 (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1| (𝐴𝑟?̂?𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖, 𝜇𝑖)) = 
Φ (𝜏𝐴𝑟?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛼 + 𝜔𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖) 
(8) 
 
The first stage (or Eq6 above) uses Probit analysis to estimate the probability that a father will 
have child support debt at given interview year (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡), based on a set of valid instruments (𝑍𝑖𝑡) 
and observed predictors. The second stage (or Eq7 above) re-estimates the child support debt 
model using an OLS regression with the fitted value of the first stage (𝐴𝑟?̂?𝑖𝑡) estimated in Eq6 and 
a set of observed predictors. The third stage (or Eq8 above) estimates the original Probit model of 
depression or alcohol abuse outcomes after replacing the endogenous variable(𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡) with the 





produces an exogenous source of variation in child support arrears, the third stage allows one to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of child support arrears on mental health outcomes. 
 The first and third columns of Table 5 present the results from the first-stage equation (Eq6) 
predicting child support arrears. As the z-statistics of these relations are both over 3.8, the 
specification does not appear to suffer from problems associated with weak instruments. The 
results from the second and fourth columns of the 3SLS show the estimated probability of having 
depression and alcohol abuse problems influenced by the predicted arrears. The 3SLS estimates 
are larger than the corresponding Probit estimates in magnitude, suggesting that the latter are 
downward-biased by confounding factors, such as measurement errors in mothers’ reports of 
arrears.   
VII. DISCUSSION 
Debt in the U.S. reached more than $10 trillion in 2017 (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 2017). A growing number of recent studies have sought to understand the impact of this 
trend on mental health among the general population. However, the trend of these debts does not 
include child support debt, the largest portion of the debt owed by noncustodial fathers. The 
present study contributes to the prior literature by extending the stress process theory in the 
context of child support enforcement policy. Using nationally representative data on nonresident 
fathers, this study provides the first evidence on whether nonresident fathers who owe child 
support debt are at risk for the development of mental health problems.  
The study provides strong evidence that fathers who owe arrears are more likely to report 
mental health problems than those who do not owe any arrears. The study also finds that fathers 
who receive more support from friends and families during childbirth were less likely to develop 





potential omitted variable bias, the study included a lagged dependent variable to control for 
fathers’ previous mental health status. As a robustness check, the study also used an instrumental 
variable approach to correct for endogeneity and measurement error associated with mothers’ 
report of fathers’ child support arrears. The results were robust to the inclusion of a rich set of 
covariates and a lagged dependent variable.   
Despite these findings, the study has several limitations. While the instrumental variable 
approach is essential for addressing concerns about measurement error in child support arrears 
reported by the mothers of focal children, it is not a panacea because the approach could not 
address the missing information about the unpaid child support owed to children of different 
mothers. Therefore, the results may be underestimated if the fathers owe child support to 
children of different mothers. The results of this study can be replicated when new data that 
contains complete information on the actual amount of arrears owed by fathers is collectible. 
 Nevertheless, the results from the current study have several implications for child support 
policy. First, debt reduction policies, such as the debt compromise programs adopted by a growing 
number of states, may have larger benefits than previously anticipated, because fathers’ mental 
health problems due to arrears are smaller. To the extent that mental health problems reduce 
employability, fathers will be less likely to lose their jobs. These fathers are also less likely to fall 
further behind in paying off their debts in the future. The study also finds strong evidence that 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Proportion of Dependent and Key Independent Variables 
 at 1-year follow-up 
(lagged value at 3-
year follow-up) 
at 3-year follow-up 
 
N=1,099 
at 5-year follow-up 
 
N=1,146 
at 9-year follow-up 
 
N=944 
Dependent variable     
     Fathers with depression (%) 13.7% 12.0% 12.3% 14.5% 
     Fathers engaged in binge drinking  (%) 10.0% 10.1% 24,3% 35.3% 
Independent variable     
     Fathers with child support arrears (%) 10.2% 27.0% 30.0% 34.9% 
     Ratio of arrears to fathers’ income  (%)     
          No arrears 89.8% 72.9% 70.0% 64.9% 
          Between 0 and .50   8.6% 21.6% 22.3% 25.4% 
          50 and over   1.6%   5.5%  7.7%   9.7% 
Note: The descriptive statistics were calculated based on the first set of imputed data. Results were similar for other 4 imputed  






Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Control, Moderator, and Instrumental 
Variables (N=3,099) 
 Mean/ %  (SD) 
Time-invariant covariates 
      Father’s educational attainment at baseline (%) 
      less than high school 34.7%  
        High school diploma 42.5%  
      Some college 19.5%  
      College graduate   3.3%  
     Race/ethnicity (%)   
      White 11.5%  
      Black 64.7%  
      Hispanic 20.8%  
      Other   3.0%  
     Father US born (%)   91.3%  
     Father’s age at baseline 26.24 (6.887) 
     Father’s intelligence (WAIS_R) 6.366 (2.573) 
     Father’s health at baseline 2.026 (0.957) 
     Father-mother relationship quality   
      father’s name on the birth certificate (%) 91.1%  
      father’s # of kids with other mothers at BL 2.134 (1.411) 
      father asked mother to have abortion (%) 11.6%  
     Mothers’ financial wellbeing at baseline   
      have UI,, disability or SSC (%) 10.3%  
      receive Income from friends and family (%) 36.9%  
     Child characteristics at baseline   
      Male (%) 51.9%  
      Low birthweight (%) 10.3%  
 Family mental health history: asked about  
fathers’ biological father 
      he was depressed or blue most of time 16.8%  
      he constantly nervous, edgy, or anxious   8.0%  
      he ever have a problem with drinking 21.0%  
      he ever have a problem with drugs 24.7%  
      he ever attempt to commit suicide   0.9%  
Moderator   
 Father received social support from friends and 
families when the baby was born (%) 
   40% 
 







Table 2. (continued) 
 Mean/ %  (SD) 
Time-varying covariates 
 
 Relationship transition  
(father becoming a non-resident parent) (%)   
      at 1-year follow-up    4.1%  
      at 3-year follow-up    8.3%  
      at 5-year follow-up  69.5%  
      at 9-year follow-up  18.1%  
 Fathers in jail (%)   
      at 3-year follow-up 12.9%  
      at 5-year follow-up 12.9%  
      at 9-year follow-up   8.1%  
 Fathers’ labor force participation (%)   
      at 3-year follow-up    
           Unemployed 16.8%  
           Part-time job (less than 35 hours) 11.8%  
           Full-time job (more than 35 hours) 71.5%  
      at 5-year follow-up   
           Unemployed 16.6%  
           Part-time job (less than 35 hours) 14.2%  
           Full-time job (more than 35 hours) 69.2%  
      at 9-year follow-up   
           Unemployed   0.4%  
           Part-time job (less than 35 hours) 18.8%  
           Full-time job (more than 35 hours) 80.8%  
A Set of potential instrumental variables  
 State’s unemployment rate (unit: one percent)   
      at 3-year follow-up 6.110 (0.925) 
        at 5-year follow-up 6.011 (1.106) 
      at 9-year follow-up 7.703 (2.411) 
 CSPIA: ability to collect arrears 
(unit: ten percentage)   
      at 3-year follow-up 5.978 (0.994) 
      at 5-year follow-up 0.602 (0.809) 
      at 9-year follow-up 6.336 (0.712) 
 Whether mothers on welfare (%)   
      at 3-year follow-up 59.7%  
      at 5-year follow-up 60.5%  
      at 9-year follow-up 57.9%  
Note: The descriptive statistics were calculated based on the first set of 
imputed data. Results were similar for other 4 imputed samples. Standard 







Table 3.Static and Dynamic Probit Regression of Mental Health and Alcohol Abuse Problems 
  Fathers with major depression  Fathers with alcohol abuse problems 












Fathers in arrears 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.036**  0.067*** 0.053** 0.059** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ratio of arrears to income (ref= no arrears)     
 Between 0 and .50 0.054*** 0.049** 0.039*  0.083*** 0.058** 0.064** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
 .50 and over 0.082** 0.048* 0.043†  0.030 0.048 0.056 
  (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) 
Lagged dependent added   0.106***    0.150*** 
    (0.017)    (0.019) 
   
Father’s educational attainment at baseline (ref= less than high school)   
 High school diploma  0.004 0.005   0.024 0.022 
   (0.015) (0.015)   (0.019) (0.019) 
 Some college  -0.011 -0.009   0.049* 0.037 
   (0.019) (0.019)   (0.025) (0.025) 
 College graduate  0.037 0.034   0.042 0.020 
   (0.046) (0.044)   (0.051) (0.049) 
Race/ethnicity (ref=White)       
 Black  -0.100*** -0.077**   -0.234*** -0.203*** 
   (0.024) (0.024)   (0.031) (0.031) 
 Hispanic  -0.084** -0.063*   -0.068+ -0.052 
   (0.028) (0.027)   (0.038) (0.038) 
 Others  -0.027 -0.035   -0.117* -0.100+ 
   (0.046) (0.043)   (0.057) (0.058) 
Father US born  0.015 0.007   0.068+ 0.063+ 
   (0.027) (0.026)   (0.037) (0.038) 
Father’s age  -0.002 -0.002   -0.008 -0.007 
   (0.007) (0.006)   (0.010) (0.010) 
Father’s age squared  -0.000 -0.000   0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Father’s intelligence (WAIS_R) 0.003 0.002   0.005 0.004 
   (0.002) (0.002)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Father’s health  0.004 0.003   0.010 0.008 
   (0.008) (0.007)   (0.009) (0.009) 
Father-mother relationship quality      
 father’s name on the 
birth certificate 
 -0.012 -0.012   0.029 0.024 
  (0.021) (0.020)   (0.030) (0.030) 
 father’s # of kids with 
other mothers 
 0.012* 0.009†   0.003 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005)   (0.006) (0.006) 
 father asked mother to 
have abortion 
 -0.014 -0.015   0.017 0.007 






Table 3. (continued) 
  Fathers with major depression  Fathers with alcohol abuse problems 












Relationship transition: father becoming 
a non-resident parent (ref=at 1-yr) 
      
 3-year follow-up  0.006 0.016   0.104* 0.107** 
   (0.038) (0.034)   (0.041) (0.037) 
 5-year follow-up  0.040 0.046   0.178*** 0.189*** 
   (0.033) (0.028)   (0.031) (0.027) 
 9-year follow-up  0.076* 0.075*   0.125*** 0.126*** 
   (0.035) (0.031)   (0.034) (0.030) 
Mothers’ financial wellbeing at baseline       
 mother has unemployment 
insurance, disability or SSC 
 -0.025 -0.020   0.027 0.025 
  (0.021) (0.020)   (0.026) (0.026) 
 Income from friends and 
family 
 0.015 0.012   0.011 0.003 
  (0.012) (0.012)   (0.017) (0.017) 
Child characteristics at baseline       
 Male  0.003 0.004   0.029+ 0.020 
   (0.012) (0.012)   (0.016) (0.016) 
 Low birthweight  0.026 0.022   -0.039 -0.036 
   (0.018) (0.018)   (0.027) (0.027) 
Time varying covariates        
 Fathers in jail at previous 
interview 
 0.037† 0.034†   -0.087** -0.083** 
  (0.020) (0.020)   (0.030) (0.031) 
    Father’s work status at previous  
    interview (ref=unemployed)  
    
      Part-time job (less than 35h) -0.011 -0.000   0.103*** 0.102*** 
   (0.027) (0.026)   (0.029) (0.029) 
      Full-time job (more than 35h) -0.054* -0.039†   0.106*** 0.100*** 
   (0.022) (0.021)   (0.023) (0.023) 
Family mental health history: Asked About fathers’ biological father   
 was depressed or blue most 
of time 
   0.054*    0.025 
   (0.023)    (0.027) 
 constantly nervous, edgy, 
or anxious 
  0.059*    0.006 
   (0.027)    (0.036) 
 ever have a problem with 
drinking 
   -0.037    0.040 
   (0.032)    (0.052) 
 ever have a problem with 
drugs 
  0.043    0.007 
   (0.032)    (0.050) 
 ever attempt to commit 
suicide 
  0.039    0.037 
   (0.057)    (0.085) 
         
Number of observations 3,088 3,088 3,088  2,886 2,886 2,886 
Individual observations 1,603 1,603 1,603  1,546 1,546 1,546 





Table 4. Heterogeneous Effects of Child Support Arrears on Noncustodial Fathers’ Mental Health 
and Alcohol Abuse Problems by Social Support  
   Fathers with major 
depression 
 Fathers with alcohol 
abuse problems 









 Fathers in Arrears      
  No arrears VS Yes Arrears      
          received social support  
 
0.029 0.024  0.032 0.022 
  (0.021) (0.020)  (0.028) (0.027) 
          did not receive social support  
 
0.060** 0.048*  0.010 0.005 
  (0.019) (0.018)  (0.021) (0.021) 
Panel 2 
 Ratio of arrears to income        
  1. No arrears VS 
    low arrears burden (between 0 and 50)   
    
          received social support  
 
0.045+ 0.036  0.048   0.050† 
  (0.025) (0.023)  (0.035) (0.034) 
          did not receive social support  
 
0.053* 0.043*  0.062* 0.068* 
  (0.021) (0.20)  (0.028) (0.028) 
  2. No arrears VS 
    high arrears burden (50 and more) 
     
          received social support -0.014 -0.008   0.116†  0.120† 
   (0.031) (0.032)  (0.071) (0.067) 




   (0.035) (0.032)  (0.049) (0.049) 
        
 Number of observations 3,088 3,088  2,886 2,886 
 Individual observations 1,603 1,603  1,546 1,546 
        
 Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 Lagged DV and initial condition added No Yes  No Yes 







Table 5. Instrumental Variable Regression of Noncustodial Fathers’ Mental Health and Alcohol 
Abuse Problems on Child Support Arrears 
  Mental health problems  Alcohol abuse problems 





















A key explanatory variable  
 Fathers in arrears        0.091***        0.190*** 
   (0.031)   (0.030) 
A Instrumental variable      
 CSPIA: percentage 
of state arrearage 
collections 
    -0.036***         -0.047***  
 (0.010)   (0.010)  
       
Father’s educational attainment at baseline (ref= less than high school)  
 High school diploma -0.005 0.007  -0.030 0.029 
  (0.020) (0.015)  (0.019) (0.018) 
 Some college 0.020 -0.009  0.004   0.047* 
  (0.026) (0.019)  (0.025) (0.023) 
 College graduate -0.102† 0.057    -0.135** 0.054 
  (0.056) (0.050)  (0.037) (0.051) 
Race/ethnicity (ref=White)    
 Black -0.072*    -0.083***  -0.059*     -0.200*** 
  (0.029) (0.024)  (0.028) (0.030) 
 Hispanic   -0.090** -0.066*    -0.080** -0.039 
  (0.034) (0.027)  (0.032) (0.036) 
 Others -0.114* -0.027  -0.070 -0.104† 
  (0.056) (0.045)  (0.050) (0.054) 
Father US born       0.148***  0.003    0.120* 0.020 
  (0.045)  (0.027)  (0.045) (0.033) 
Father’s age   0.016† -0.003  0.011 -0.008 
  (0.009) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.007) 
Father’s age squared -0.000* 0.000  -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Father’s intelligence  0.007† 0.002  0.002 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Father’s health 0.001 0.004  -0.007 0.010 







Table 5. (continued) 
  Instrumental variable regression 
  Mental health problems  Alcohol abuse problems 





















Father-mother relationship quality    
 father’s name on the 
birth certificate 
-0.055† -0.012  -0.044 0.028 
 (0.029) (0.021)  (0.027) (0.028) 
 father’s # of kids with 
other mothers 
0.008 0.010†  0.003 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006) 
 father asked mother to 
have abortion 
0.005 -0.019  0.009 0.018 
 (0.028) (0.020)  (0.024) (0.024) 
Mothers’ financial wellbeing at baseline    
 mother has UI, 
disability or SSC 
0.003 -0.026  0.016 0.027 
 (0.029) (0.021)  (0.025) (0.024) 
 Income from friends 
and family 
0.028   0.013†    0.043*  0.001 
 (0.018) (0.013)  (0.017) (0.016) 
Child characteristics at baseline    
 Male    0.051**  0.003     0.045** 0.023 
  (0.017) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.015) 
 Low birthweight 0.039 0.027   0.036 -0.045† 
  (0.027) (0.019)  (0.024) (0.025) 
Time varying covariates    
 Fathers in jail at 
previous interview 
 0.057†   0.034†  0.040   -0.092** 
 (0.031) (0.020)  (0.036) (0.029) 
     Father’s work status at previous interview (ref=unemployed)  
      Part-time job  
    (less  than 35h) 
0.053 -0.010    0.073*   0.090** 
 (0.033) (0.026)  (0.029) (0.028) 
      Full-time job    
    (more than 35h) 
0.009 -0.049*    0.059*    0.096** 
 (0.027) (0.021)  (0.025) (0.023) 
 Family mental health history: Asked About fathers’ biological father  
      was depressed or  
     blue most of time 
0.006 0.062*  0.037 0.0233 
 (0.040) (0.025)  (0.036) (0.027) 
      constantly nervous,    
     edgy, or anxious 
0.040 0.070*  0.006 0.005 
 (0.048) (0.029)  (0.048) (0.038) 
      ever have a   
     drinking problem 
-0.024 -0.045  0.006 0.033 
 (0.058) (0.032)  (0.046) (0.049) 
      ever have drug    
     problems 
0.030 0.053†  0.008 0.011 
 (0.053) (0.031)  (0.044) (0.048) 
      ever attempt to   
     commit suicide 
0.030 0.043  -0.068 0.021 
 (0.090) (0.058)  (0.083) (0.083) 






Figure 1. Stress Process Model for Noncustodial Fathers with Child Support Arrears 































Appendix 1. Child Support Performance and Incentive Act for Arrearage Collection 
Measurement 
The construction of the arrearage collection measurement assigned to each observation unfolds 
in two steps: First, Data on performance indicators were collected from the Office of Child 
Support Enforcement (OCSE) annual reports (1999-2010). Arrearage collection measurement 
was measured as percentages, and the method of measuring each indicator was given as follow: 
Number of cases paying towards arrears in IV − D 
Number of cases with arrears  due in IV − D
 
Next, the performance indicator was assigned to each observation, based on the state where the 
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Non-marital births in the United States have increased over several decades, and today, 
40 percent of all births now occur outside of marriage (McLanahan & Sawhill, 2015). In 
addition, there are a growing number of children who were not living with their biological 
fathers at the time of birth (Carlson, 2012). Past research overwhelmingly shows that children in 
families headed by single mothers are at high risk of poverty, and score lower on cognitive and 
behavioral assessments than their peers from two-parent households (McLanahan, 1995, 2004).  
Low-income single mothers may have several strategies to cope with financial difficulties 
arising from single parenting. For these mothers, the surest way to move out of poverty is to get 
married to (or at least live with) a man who can support both mother and child. Marriage has 
been viewed as the strongest tool for poverty eradication in the United States among low-
income, uneducated mothers (Amato & Maynard, 2007; Brown, 2010). According to data from 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, for instance, the poverty rate for a single parent 
without a high school diploma is 25% percent, whereas the rate for a married parent with same 
educational attainment is only 12% percent (Wilcox, 2015).25 
As money matters in the relationship market, the child support system plays a significant, 
but a mixed role in residential union formation patterns among these mothers. There is a 
substantial body of literature about how child support enforcement affect union formation, 
although the results are mixed (Acs & Nelson, 2004; Bloom, Conrad, & Miller, 1996; Carlson, 
Garfinkel, McLanahan, Mincy, & Primus, 2004; Folk, Graham, & Beller, 1992; Mincy & 
Dupree, 2001; Yun, 1992). What is less understood and less well-documented in the literature is 
the possible effects of child support arrears accumulation on a residential union formation among 
                                                          





both mothers and fathers who were not resident at childbirth. More specifically, the study will 
address the question of whether a decrease in fathers’ disposable income due to child support 
arrears is responsible for both mothers’ and fathers’ residential union formation with one another 
or with a new partner. To examine the association between child support debt and new union 
formation among nonresident couples at childbirth, the proposed study will use data from the 
Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study, a cohort study that tracks unmarried couples 
shortly after child’s birth with follow-up interviews when the focal child was approximately one, 
three, five, and nine years of age. The study will focus on nonresident parents who had a baby 
born in twenty large U.S. cities between 1998 and 2000. 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
A Theory of Marriage and Other Relationships  
Theoretical underpinnings for custodial and noncustodial parents’ chances of union 
formation come from the microeconomic perspective initially suggested by Gary Becker (1973). 
In Becker’s point of view, unmarried men and women see each other as potential trading 
partners. In a relationship market, a couple jointly decides to get married rather than to remain 
single when each partner has more to gain from one another. The term “gain” may vary by 
individuals but, in general, contains human capital, an effective division of labor (also known as 
‘specialization’), and affections (Becker, 1973). Therefore, unmarried men and women will keep 
looking for a mate until the expected gain they would get from the mate does not surpass the 
additional costs incurred for searching for a new partner.  
Scholars after Becker have developed theories applied to the non-traditional marriage 
market. Many scholars pay closer attention to the growing variety of family structures, such as 





transitioning from singlehood to non-marital cohabitation because they can get benefits from 
each other by sharing living expenses without legal constraints (Bumpass, Sweet, & Cherlin, 
1991; Seltzer, 2000). Moreover, as cohabitation is becoming more institutionalized, state and 
local governments are now becoming more lenient toward cohabitating couples by granting them 
some of the rights that married couples gained through marriage (Cherlin, 2004). For instance, in 
2009 the federal government extended health insurance to domestic partners, benefits that had 
only been available to immediate family in the past.  As a result, some of the theoretical 
considerations contemplated by Becker (1973)  are also relevant to decisions about cohabitation. 
 
Nonresident Couples at the Time of Birth and New Union Formation 
Along with the increase of children who were raised by unmarried parents, it is a new 
phenomenon that many children in the U.S. are not living with their biological fathers at the time 
of birth (Carlson, 2012). Such fathers are previously missing from the survey data, so little is 
known about whether these fathers would form a union with a new partner after union 
dissolution with the child’s mother. Previous studies show that these fathers are relatively 
socioeconomically disadvantaged compared to their married or cohabited counterparts (Mincy, 
Jethwani, & Klempin, 2014). Therefore, based on the Becker’s theory explained above, this 
result can lead to the hypothesis that fathers may have an incentive to enter the relationship 
market more actively if they face financial burden, such as child support obligations. At the same 
time, they may be less attractive in the relationship market due to their low socioeconomic 
position.  
Based on the premises of assortative mating, the mothers who did not live with her 





economic resources would also be a key factor for these mothers in deciding whether to enter the 
relationship market. However, previous studies show that mothers are less likely than fathers to 
remarry or cohabit after union dissolution (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002; Buckle, Gallup Jr, & 
Rodd, 1996; Wu & Schimmele, 2005).26  One possible explanation for these findings is that 
mothers may find it difficult to enter into the relationship market if they cannot manage to handle 
childcare and work at the same time. This is especially true for mothers with limited ability to 
meet childcare needs through work or other financial opportunities (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003).  
A mother with co-resident children is usually perceived as a less desirable partner for a 
man with no co-residential children. If this mother meets a man in the relationship market, he is 
usually a father who lives with his children (Goldscheider & Sassler, 2006). This trend seems to 
be more apparent for mothers with young children who often spend more time in childcare 
activities than mothers with older children or childless women (Sweeney, 1997).  
Child support and Union Formation  
A range of empirical research on child support systems has provided mixed results. Folk 
et al. (1992), using data drawn from 1979-1984 CPS, suggested that child support payments 
appear to have no effect on remarriage among divorced mothers, whereas Yun (1992) suggested 
that such payments have a small but positive effect on marital formation in the long-run.  Bloom 
et al. (1996) focused on mixed evidence associated with fathers’ remarriage, showing that a 
decrease in father’s disposable income due to strict child support policy does not discourage him 
from getting married.  
Results from longitudinal studies with different subsamples contradict previous findings. 
Using a subsample of unmarried couples in FFCWS, Mincy and Dupree (2001) found that more 
                                                          





aggressive child support enforcement would reduce the mother’s plan to cohabit with her child’s 
biological father. This work was further extended by Carlson et al. (2004) who reported that 
unmarried mothers are less likely to get married to their child’s biological father when the child 
support enforcement is strong. Note that the two studies from FFCWS have focused on the 
changes in union formation involving parents with a child in common.  
In light of past research, the father’s accumulation of arrears is expected to reduce the 
likelihood of union transition among biological parents. More specifically, arrears accumulation 
will make it harder for fathers to form cohabiting or marital unions with the mother of their 
children. However, the effect of arrears accumulation on union formation with new partners is 
ambiguous. For example, arrears accumulation reduces the disposable income available to 
mothers, unless it is owed to the state. As a result, the mother will spend more time searching for 
a new partner in the relationship market, which increases the likelihood of a transition to a stable 
relationship. However, lower disposable income will make her a less attractive partner for men in 
the relationship market than other mothers who receive all the child support due. As for the 
father, the unfulfilled financial obligations from a previous relationship can reduce nonresident 
fathers’ disposable income, making them less attractive in the relationship market. At the same 
time, lower disposable income can increase fathers’ incentive to transition into marital or 
cohabiting unions. Thus, whether arrears accumulation increases or decreases the likelihood of 
union formation with new partners for mothers and nonresident fathers is an empirical question, 
which no previous study has addressed.  
The answer to this question has an important implication for child support policy. 
Suppose that the accumulation of arrears reduces the prospects that mothers and nonresident 





policies that limit the growth of arrears (e.g., charging interest and penalties on unpaid child 
support, making it easier for low-income nonresident fathers to downward modify child support 
orders).  
In sum, the study will investigate whether fathers’ burden associated with child support 
arrears affects the transition to a residential union formation among couples who were not living 
together at the time of childbirth. 27 In this study, each noncustodial parent will choose following 
three mutually exclusive union formation during the survey period: 1) stay single, 2) resident 
with a new partner, or 3) resident with one another. The event-history analysis is conducted 
using a discrete-time competing risks hazard model in which the transition to either marriage or 
cohabitation and remain single are treated as competing events.  
III. METHODS 
Analytic Sample 
I draw on data from the FFCWS baseline and nine-year follow-up surveys. The present study 
will be restricted to 1,900 children whose biological parents were not living together at the time 
of the child’s birth: this includes 1,255 parents who were romantically involved but living apart 
(i.e, visiting), and 606 parents who were not in a romantic relationship (i.e, friends, hardly talk, 
and never talk). This baseline sample will be decomposed into two sub-samples: one for fathers’ 
union transitions and the other for mothers’ union transitions. Both sub-samples will be further 
restricted to parents who reported their relationship status across all subsequent waves. The 
observations will be censored if the parents transition into cohabitation or marriage with a 
current or new partner. This yields a final sample size of 4,163 observations for mothers’ union 
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transitions (1,900 at one year, 1,058 at three years, 713 at five years, and 492 at nine years after 
the child’s birth) and a size of 2,739 observations for fathers’ union transitions (1,900 at one 
year, 470 at three years, 232 at five years, and 134 at nine years after the child’s birth).  
To impute missing information on independent variable and covariates, the study uses 
multiple imputation using chained equation (MICE). Note that missing information on the 
dependent variables, instead, these observations will be dropped from the analysis.  
Dependent Variable 
The main outcome of interest will be union transitions. Both mothers and fathers were 
asked about their relationship status at each wave. The union formation will be classified into 
three mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories: (a) married to or cohabitation with a baby’s 
biological parent, (b) married to or cohabitation with a new partner, or (c) remain single at the 
time of the survey (reference). 28  
The current study does not decompose “remain single” category into a set of potential 
subcategories such as “a romantic but non-residential union (or "visiting union”) for two reasons: 
The first reason is related to the nature of the hazard model. Once parents transition to a new 
union, they will be censored to avoid reverse causality. If the study defines “non-resident 
romantic relationship” as a new form of family union, many unmarried parents will be censored 
from the study at a relatively early stage due to relationship churning. Such churning occurs in 
on-again /off-again relationships within or across partners (Halpern-Meekin & Turney, 2016; 
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to a baby’s biological parents, (b) cohabitation with a baby’s biological parents, (c) married to a 
new partner, (d) cohabitation with a new partner, and (e) remain single. However, this five- 
categoryapproach is usually of limited statistical power, given the study’s modest sample size. 
For this reason, I am going to pursue a second strategy where I collapse into marriage and 





Nepomnyaschy & Teitler, 2013) and is especially frequent when children are younger than five 
years old (Turney & Halpern-Meekin, 2017). The first five years after the focal child’s birth may 
not be enough time to accumulate arrears because doing so involves, moving from informal to 
formal child support and defaulting on a child support order (Kim, Cancian, & Meyer, 2015; 
Sorensen, Sousa, & Schaner, 2007). Thus, it is unlikely that child support arrears are responsible 
for such churning. By contrast, marriage or cohabitation can be directly affected by the fathers’ 
unfulfilled financial obligations because it takes a relatively long time for couples to establish 
such a relationship. If parents who are censored by relationship churning are later married or 
cohabiting, one will not be able to observe how child support arrears affect these subsequent 
union transitions. The second reason is that having arrears may not be a major hindrance for 
parents with low socioeconomic backgrounds to transitioning to a nonresidential-romantic 
relationship. This is because of the cost of such unions is a relatively smaller commitment than 
other types of union formation, like marriage or cohabitation. If so, then classifying the 
additional union formation that is not predicted by fathers’ arrearage status may reduce the 
number of subjects in each category, and result in reduced statistical power.  
Fathers’ Child Support Arrears  
The fathers’ child support arrears will be measured across each wave mainly reported by 
mothers. Fathers’ report on arrears will be used if the mother’s report is missing or if the father 
has any unpaid child support obligations from previous partners. Both parents were first asked 
whether the father has any arrears that he is supposed to pay to the mothers (or previous partners) 
or to the government. If they said “yes”, then they were further asked the amount of the arrears 
that the father actually accrued. I coded as a dichotomous indicator in the model that identifies 






 To attenuate potential omitted variable bias, the study uses a large set of control variables 
identified in previous studies. The vector of control variables consists of time-invariant 
covariates and time-varying covariates. Time-invariant covariates are obtained from the baseline 
survey. Time-varying covariates are obtained one wave before the wave at which the relationship 
outcomes occur to avoid potential bias associated with reverse causality.  
 First, the analyses include basic demographic characteristics of each parent. Mother’s and 
father’s race and ethnicity are measured as a series of dummy variables: Non-Hispanic White 
(reference), Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and Others. Their nationality is coded as a dummy 
variable, with 1 indicating whether they were born in the United States. Fathers’ and Mothers’ 
age are measured in years at the time of childbirth. The study includes two pieces of information 
about the child: (1) gender (1=Male, 2=Female), and (2) low-birth weight (1=baby less than 
2,500 grams, 0=baby more than or equal to 2,500 grams).  
 Next, the study also controls for several economic characteristics of each parent, 
including educational attainment, work status, income, and whether the mother receives welfare 
benefits. Educational attainment is measured at the time of childbirth and is coded as a series of 
dummy variables: less than high school (reference), high school graduate, some college, and 
college graduate. Work status is measured as a time-varying variable with three categories: 
unemployed (reference), part-time employment, and full-time employment. Annual earnings are 
measured by self-report in which both mothers and fathers were asked how much they earned 
based on hours/weeks they reported. For a measure of the mother’s financial wellbeing, the study 





disability insurance, or social security. These two controls (parents’ work status and whether 
mothers on welfare) are also measured as time-varying covariates.  
 The study also includes a set of variables representing the behavioral and health 
characteristics of parents. As one dimension of behavioral characteristics of fathers, the study 
uses a dichotomous variable indicating whether the fathers had ever been in jail, reported by the 
mother of their child at each survey interview. Note that this indicator was constructed by 
FFCWS researchers. The health quality for both parents is measured at each wave, with 1 being 
‘Poor to 5 being ‘Excellent.’  
 Finally, the study incorporates following five pieces of information relating to the 
relationship quality between mothers and fathers: religious homogamy, mothers’ relationship 
duration with the child’s father before pregnant, the presence of multiple partner fertility, 
whether fathers’ name on the birth certificate, and whether father asked the mother to have an 
abortion. First, religious homogamy is assessed with a dummy variable indicating 1 if the 
religious preference is the same for both father and mother. Relationship duration before 
childbirth is measured as the number of years by asking mothers “how long did you know the 
child’s father before you got pregnant” at the baseline survey. To account for the prevalence of 
multiple partner fertility of each parent, the study includes a dummy variable, which takes on a 
value of one if the parent has children with someone other than the mother/father of a focal child. 
The absence of a father’s name on the birth certificate is a dummy variable coded as 1 at the 
baseline survey if the mother reported that the father did not want his name on the birth 
certificate. Lastly, the study includes a dummy variable that equals 1 if the father asked the 





Table 1 provides weighted descriptions for these covariates.29 The first column of Table 1 
covers mothers’ information, and the second column covers fathers’ information. Each 
measurement is taken from the person directly involved unless otherwise noted. If the 
information is not confined to each mother and father, such as the gender of the child, the study 
uses the information that the mother reported. As shown in Table 1, the current sample is 
dominated by racial minorities for both mothers and fathers. Mothers are relatively economically 
disadvantaged compared to fathers, and these gaps are widening over time after childbirth. In 
addition, more and more mothers rely on welfare income, and even more fathers have reported 
that they were in jail in the past. Fathers and mothers in the sample spent, on average, three years 
in the relationship before the focal child was born, and more than 35 percent of them had the 
same religion at the time the child was born. Lastly, most fathers signed the birth certificate, 
while one in five of them asked mothers to have an abortion.   
 
Analytic Strategy  
The study uses a discrete-time competing risks hazard model to estimate the role of 
fathers’ indebtedness while controlling for the other covariates on transitioning to cohabitation 
and marriage after union dissolution. Unlike the Cox-proportional hazard model, the discrete-
time hazard model can allow one to include time-varying repressors in the estimation. In this 
study, the unit of analysis for the mothers’ study is the mother and those of analysis for the 
fathers’ study is the father, respectively. The event outcome is union formation, defined as 
cohabitation or marriage. Given that these two events are jointly determined, a multinomial logit 
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model is estimated. The length of the event is defined as the time elapsed between the birth of 
the focal child and union transitions to either cohabitation or marriage. 30 I use a wave as one 
interval unit (one, three, five, and nine years after the focal child’s birth). If the event has not 
occurred by the end of the survey period, the duration will be right-censored. Once the 
observations are transitioned into cohabitation or marriage, they will be censored to avoid 
reverse causality. The first model specification (Model 1) for the analysis is given by the 
following equation: 
 ln (
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, = 0)













𝑟 = 0  if remain single in 𝑡 
𝑟 = 1 if married to or cohabitation with a baby’s biological parent in 𝑡 (𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1)
𝑟 = 2 if married to or cohabitation with a new partner in 𝑡 (𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2) 
}, 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, = 0) is the probability of event type r during interval t given no event has 
occurred in the previous interval, 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
(𝑟)
 denotes a vector of functions of the cumulative 
duration by interval t (at one, three, five, or nine years since childbirth) for event type r with a 
coefficient 𝛼, and 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡−1
(𝑟)
 is a binary variable for arrears at t-1.  
In the subsequent models, I add vectors of covariates to Eq 1 to account for selection 
bias: 
                                                          







Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, = 0)




















is a vector of time-varying covariates with a vector of coefficients 𝛽3 for event type r,  
Χ𝑖
(𝑟)
is a vector of time-invariant covariates with a vector of coefficients 𝛽4 for event type r, and 
𝜀𝑖
(𝑟)





)~multivariate normal.  
 
IV. RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the life table estimates of the cumulative risk of new union formation for 
both mothers and fathers after childbirth. The table shows that, within one year after childbirth, 
approximately 10 percent of mothers re-partnered, with 7 percent choosing the father of their 
child and 3 percent choosing a new partner. During the same period, 13 percent of fathers re-
partnered, with 9.5 percent choosing the mother of their child and 3.5 percent choosing a new 
partner. By 5 years after the birth of the focal child, 45.5 percent of mothers formed a new union, 
with 19.4 percent choosing the child’s father and 25.1 percent choosing a new partner. The 
corresponding rates for men were 25.8 percent and 26.0 percent, respectively. Nine years after 
childbirth, 31.4 percent of mothers and 30.2 percent of fathers remain single. These results are 
consistent with previous literature reviews, suggesting that women had a lower re-partnering rate 
than men did and the timing of the re-partnering is slower for mothers (Wu & Schimmele, 2005).   
The results of the discrete-time event analysis are reported in Table 3 for mothers’ 
residential union formation and Table 4 for fathers’ residential union formation, respectively. 





four columns to union formation with a new partner. Model 1 controls for basic demographic 
characteristics of the couples and their children. Model 2, 3, and 4 respectively add each parent’s 
economic, behavioral, and relationship characteristics that are likely to affect the new union 
formation decision. In each model, coefficients on the survey dummy variables and the fathers’ 
child support indebtedness are presented in the top portion of the tables, and coefficients on the 
other covariates are presented in the bottom portion of the tables.  
Union Formation of Single Custodial Mothers after Childbirth 
The first column of Table 3 presents the log odds of custodial mothers transitioning to a 
residential union formation with a father of their child versus remaining single. For mothers, 
chances of living with the father of their child decline over time: the odds of union formation 
between biological parents at nine-year survey are 23% (OR=0.769) lower than the odds of such 
union formation at the one-year survey. Chances of living with a new partner, on the other hand, 
tend to be higher over time. The results from the fifth column of Table 3 show that compared to 
the mothers forming a union with a new partner at the one-year survey, the odds of such union 
formation are 1.848 times higher by the three-year survey, 2.527 times higher by the five-year 
survey, and 1.412 times higher by the nine-year survey.  
The study provides strong evidence that fathers’ accumulation of arrears reduces the 
likelihood of union formation between biological parents. In Table 3, for instance, having fathers 
who accumulate child support arrears decreases the odds of marriage or cohabitation among 
biological parents by 72.9% (OR=0.271). Obviously, this result is almost identical to the result in 
Table 4 (OR=0.243). In the subsequent Models, which introduce the remaining controls, arrears 
coefficient does not significantly change in magnitude and remains significant at 0.1 percent 





does not support the hypothesis that the arrears may affect the mothers’ decision to form a union 
with a new partner. The coefficient on the arrears is positive but not statistically different from 
zero at the ten percent level (See the fifth column of Table 3).  
The study observes a number of significant associations with the mothers’ decision to 
form a new union formation among the covariates. Model 1 only includes parents’ demographic 
characteristics. Consistent with previous research, the study finds that Black mothers are less 
likely to enter a stable relationship with the father of their child and/or with the new partner than 
White mothers, while foreign-born mothers are more likely than native-born mothers to form a 
stable relationship with the father of their child. In addition, mothers are less likely to form a 
stable union with their child’s father who was older at the childbirth. Likewise, mothers who 
were older at the child’s birth are less likely to form a union with a new partner. Again, the 
addition of the demographic characteristics does not significantly change the estimated 
coefficients for child support arrears.  
Model 2 adds parents’ economic characteristics to model 1. As shown in the second 
column of Table 3, the income of both parents increases the odds of union formation between 
biological parents. In addition, the odds of mothers being married to or cohabiting with a father 
who works full time are 1.343 times higher than are the odds of mothers being married to or 
cohabiting with a father who is unemployed. Economic vulnerability is also significantly 
associated with the likelihood of mothers’ union formation with a new partner. The sixth column 
of Table 3 shows that mothers who are welfare recipients are 1.299 times more likely to form a 
union with a new partner than are those non-welfare mothers. In addition, mothers who 
graduated from some college are 1.318 times (OR=0.759) less likely to form a union with a new 





Model 3 adds parents’ behavioral and health characteristics to model 2. The third column 
of Table 3 shows that the odds of being married to or cohabitating with the father are 1.618 times 
(OR=0.618) lower if the father has ever been in jail. Model 4 adds relationship characteristics to 
model 3. For mothers, the odds of being married to or cohabiting with the father are 1.231 times 
(OR=0.812) lower if the father has multiple partner fertility. The odds of union formation with a 
new partner are 1.533 times higher for mothers who have children with someone other than the 
focal child’s father than are those who have not. The chances of living with the fathers are lower 
(OR=0.701) if the father asked the mother to have an abortion when she was pregnant. Mothers 
who had a father’s name on the birth certificate of their child are 2.583 times more likely to enter 
a marital or cohabiting union with the father than are those without such certificate. The mothers, 
on the other hands, are less likely to enter a union with a new partner if they had a father’s name 
on the child’s birth certificate (OR=0.723).   
Union Formation of Single Noncustodial Fathers after Childbirth 
 Table 4 shows the log odds of noncustodial fathers transitioning to a new union 
formation. Since the results for union formation between biological parents reported from the 
first four columns of Table 4 are almost identical to those shown in Table 3, such results are not 
reported in the text, but they are available upon request. For fathers, chances of living with a new 
partner had shown a steady increase by the five-year survey since childbirth, but then 
substantially reduced at the nine-year survey. For instance, compared to the fathers forming a 
union with a new partner at the one-year survey, the odds of such union are 1.642 times higher 
by the three-year survey, 2.019 times higher by five-year survey, but 7.042 times (OR=1.632) 





 The study shows that child support arrears may affect the fathers’ decisions to form a 
union with a new partner. In the fifth column of Table 4, for instance, fathers who accumulate 
child support arrears are 1.632 times more likely to form a union with a new partner than are 
those who do not. Arrears coefficient does not significantly change in magnitude and remains 
significant when adjusting for the potential confounding variables.  
 The findings for the control variables are generally consistent with the previous research 
on union formation after childbirth. As shown in the fifth column (Model 1) of Table 4, White 
fathers are more likely to form a union with a new partner than Black fathers, while older fathers 
at the child’s birth are less likely to enter a stable relationship with a new partner. In addition, 
fathers are less likely to form a stable relationship with a mother of their child or a new partner if 
the child was born with weight lower than 2,500g. Model 2 adds parents’ economic 
characteristics to model 1 and shows that fathers who work full time are 1.432 times more likely 
to form a union with a new partner than are those who are unemployed. Model 3 shows that by 
adding parents’ behavioral and health characteristics to model 2, fathers who have ever been 
incarcerated are less likely to have a stable relationship with their child’s mother or new partner 
than fathers who have not. Lastly, model 4 shows that, by adding relationship characteristics to 
model 3, fathers are more likely to form a union with a new partner if they have children with 
someone other than the focal child’s mother, or if the father and mother have different religious 
beliefs.   
 
Robustness Check: Propensity-Score Based Estimates   
The findings from the regression-based discrete-time event analysis suggest that fathers 





On the other hand, the chances of living with the mother are high if the father had no arrears 
burden. These results, however, may be driven by selection bias if there is a certain type of father 
who is both more likely to owe child support debt and more likely to form a new union later on. 
The current study accounts for such potential selection bias by including a rich assortment of 
demographic and human capital variables that were identified in the previous literature. In 
practice, however, the regression-based methods, our models included, may cause a serious 
problem if there is a lack of overlap in covariate distributions across the treatment and the control 
group. For instance, in Miller and Mincy’s study (2012), there were not many fathers with high 
arrears burdens who are also rich and well-educated, in comparison to those fathers with no 
arrears. Obviously, the likelihood of such a problem would be higher for a model with a large 
number of covariates. These estimates may distort the true effect of being a father with arrears 
burden on union formation after childbirth. Therefore, it seems that some alternative causal 
inference techniques are necessary to adequately address the study’s selection bias issue. 
As an alternative to the regression-based method, this paper uses two propensity score-
based models: a propensity score matching with a caliper and an inverse probability of treatment 
weighting (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1984, 1985). These two models reduce or eliminate the 
effect of systematic differences in demographic characteristics between treated (fathers with 
arrears burden) and untreated subjects (fathers with no arrears) on outcomes.    
Propensity score matching with a caliper (PSM). The purpose of this method is to carry out a 
matched comparison group that is similar to our treatment group (fathers with arrears burden). 
Three consecutive steps are conducted to achieve the goal. First, logistic regression is used to 





confounding demographic covariates. The value of this probability is called a propensity score, 
which can be derived as follows: 
 Pr(𝑍 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥1, … 𝑥𝑝) =  ê(𝑋) (3) 
, where Pr denotes probability, X = 𝑥1, … 𝑥𝑝 is a vector of confounding demographic covariates, 
Z=1 is a treatment assignment indicating fathers with arrears burden, and ê(𝑋)is an estimated 
propensity score. Thus, this score is measured by each individual’s own demographic 
characteristics that contribute to being assigned to the treatment group.  
 Second, the estimated propensity score is used to create a matched comparison group for 
the treatment group (a father who are assigned to have an arrear burden) from the overall 
comparison group (a father who are not assigned to have an arrear burden). For example, if a 
father in the comparison group had a propensity score of .5, he would be assigned to the matched 
comparison group for those fathers in the treatment group who had a same or similar propensity 
scores. The study employs a nearest neighbor matching with replacement technique within a 
.01 radius of caliper distance (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). 31 The nearest neighbor matching 
with replacement technique allows an individual in the comparison group to be selected multiple 
times for the people in the treatment group who have a close propensity score. If the propensity 
scores are equally close to one another, the untreated individuals are randomly selected. The 
closeness in our matching technique was restricted by a pre-specified width of propensity scores, 
called caliper distance. If no fathers in the comparison group had propensity scores that located 
within a range of caliper, the treated fathers within that caliper would not be matched with any 
fathers in the comparison group. These unmatched fathers in the treated group would be, 
therefore, dropped out from the matched sample.  Since there is no specific rule of thumb for 
                                                          





choosing the width of the caliper (Austin, 2011), the study chose the caliper at .01, which leads 
to meet the balance in confounding covariates between matched comparison group and treatment 
group. Checking the balance was conducted using a psbal2 command in STATA15. Further 
details about a balancing test are discussed in Appendix 1.  
 In the third step, the study employs the average treatment effect for those who actually 
were treated (ATT), which makes inference on a specific subpopulation, that is, a group of 
fathers with arrears. 32 ATT is defined as the expected differences in potential outcomes:  
 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
1|𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 = 1) (4) 
Each observation (father or mother) i has two potential outcomes, the potential control outcome 
𝑌𝑖
0 under the (lagged) treatment condition (𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 = 1), and the potential treatment outcome  𝑌𝑖
1 
under the lagged treatment condition as well. Many researchers in using propensity score 
matching tended to compare these potential outcomes ( 𝑌𝑖
1 - 𝑌𝑖
0) for the estimation of treatment 
effect. This method, called the difference in means, is, however, likely to have large standard 
errors (Austin, 2011). To reduce the standard error, this study uses the regression-adjusted 
matched estimates technique. This method regresses the outcome not only on a treatment 
indicator but also on a set of confounding covariates in order to have a second chance to account 
for variables that the study may not have balanced perfectly.  
Inverse probability of treatment weight (IPTW): Using the propensity score matching with 
caliper method to estimate the effects would drop some unmatched subjects in the treatment 
group, and as a result, might aggravate a precision of estimates. Moreover, if the omitted subjects 
                                                          
32 As to the policy makers, they may not be interested in comparing this group of fathers with 
those fathers who have no arrears burdens as they may have some unobserved baseline 
characteristics that are correlated with the union formation. Therefore, if we have those groups of 
two fathers be compared, we cannot guarantee that changing in union formation is caused by 





are a significant proportion of the population when the matched sample is being constructed, it 
will be difficult to generalize the results to the entire population. To avoid these problems, an 
alternative method that gives weight to either or both the treatment and comparison group was 
introduced (Hirano & Imbens, 2001).  
 This method named inverse probability of treatment weight (IPTW) uses weights based 
upon each subject’s propensity score, 𝑒𝑖. As to ATT estimand, the goal of IPTW is to create a 
pseudo sample by re-weighting the comparison group that looks like the treatment group. 
Weights in estimating ATT can be defined as follows: 




Let 𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 denote an indicator of whether or not the i
th father was treated (being assigned to have 
arrears). If the father was assigned to the treatment group (𝑧𝑖 = 1) at wave t-1. If the father was 
assigned to the lagged treatment group (𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 = 1), there is no need to re-weight, as he would get 
a weight of 1.  If the father was assigned to the comparison group (𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 = 0), he would get 
weights equal to 
𝑒𝑖
1−𝑒𝑖
; the denominator of this weighted equation is the probability of not 
receiving a given treatment, and the numerator is the probability of being in the treatment group 
(, or propensity score). This inverse probability-weighted equation makes fathers in the 
comparison group look like fathers in the treatment group. Therefore, in the third step, the IPTW 
estimate of the ATT estimand is employed by following estimating equation: 



















where n denotes the number of observations, and 𝑦𝑖indicates the union formation outcomes 
measured on the ith father (or mother) at wave t. Again, each parent in the comparison group was 
weighted by  
(1−𝑧𝑖𝑡−1)𝑒𝑖
(1−𝑒𝑖)
, making these observations similar to those in the treatment group.  
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the propensity-based analyses separately for 
mothers’ union formation (Panel 1), and fathers’ union formation (Panel 2). The first two 
columns present the results from PSM, while the last two columns present the results from the 
IPTW. The results of mothers’ union formation are, in general, consistent with those estimated 
using the regression-based method. As for the results of fathers’ union formation, however, there 
are some discrepancies in the magnitudes of arrears effects. In the PSM, 165 unmatched subjects 
are excluded from the treatment group. Since these subjects are considered vulnerable fathers 
who do not have any matched subjects with similar propensity scores in the control group, the 
arrears effects in the PSM model with no such fathers are, of course, reduced. For instance, in the 
PSM model (shown in Panel 2 of Table 5), fathers who accumulate child support arrears are only 
1.651 times more likely to form a union with a new partner than are those who do not, whereas 
the odds is 1.731 times in the regression-based model (see Model 4 in Table 4). Once the omitted 
fathers are taken into account in IPTW model, however, the arrears effects increase by 10.5-fold 
(OR=1.824, see Panel 2 of Table 5), the odds of which are even 5.3 fold higher than the one in 
the regression-based model. Thus, the results of fathers’ union formation from the regression-
based discrete-time event analysis reported in Table 4 may underestimate the actual arrears 
effects.  
V. DISCUSSION 
  Non-marital births in the United States have become prevalent in recent decades, 





& Jencks, 2004). Many of these couples are at risk for relationship dissolution at some point 
during their child’s life (Dush, Kotila, & Schoppe-Sullivan, 2011). The absence of biological 
fathers from the household is adversely associated with their child’s wellbeing (Amato, 2005).  
In addition, emerging evidence suggests that single mothers are more likely than married 
mothers to be in poverty (Cancian & Reed, 2008). Many of these mothers and politicians are 
thinking of marriage as a tool to alleviate child poverty and its adverse effects (Amato & 
Maynard, 2007; Brown, 2010). In response to these trends, a growing body of research has 
sought to understand what factors contribute to the marriage or re-partnering behaviors among 
unwed mothers and fathers after the childbirth (Berger, Cancian, & Meyer, 2012; Bzostek, 
McLanahan, & Carlson, 2012). The findings of these previous studies are consistent with the 
theory of marriage (Becker, 1973; Bumpass, Sweet, & Martin, 1990; Cherlin, 2009; 
Oppenheimer, 1988), suggesting that economic capabilities are the primary determinant of their 
re-partnering behaviors (Bzostek et al., 2012). Since money matters in the relationship market, 
the child support system can also play a significant role in the union formation patterns among 
these parents.  
Although there are some studies that have demonstrated the role of child support in union 
formation for both mothers and fathers (Acs & Nelson, 2004; Bloom, Conrad, & Miller, 1996; 
Carlson, Garfinkel, McLanahan, Mincy, & Primus, 2004; Folk, Graham, & Beller, 1992; Mincy 
& Dupree, 2001; Yun, 1992), little is known about the conditions in which fathers could not 
meet their child support obligations because of their high arrears burdens. This is an important 
question because, in recent years, there has been a growing number of noncustodial fathers who 
have limited ability to support custodial families of children financially (Kim et al., 2015; 





child support arrears would affect the transition to a new union formation among parents who 
were not living together at the time of childbirth. The study draws on data from a large 
longitudinal birth cohort study and uses a regression-based discrete-time event analysis. As 
regression-based analyses may be inappropriate for estimating the causal effects of the study, the 
study also explores propensity score methods to estimate the treatment effects (being a father 
with arrears burden) that apply specifically to a group of fathers with arrears burdens. 
The study reveals a number of interesting findings. First, mothers have a lower re-
partnering rate than fathers do: the life table estimates of the cumulative risk of new union 
formation indicate that, within five years of childbirth, approximately 56 percent of mothers and 
48 percent of fathers remained single (see Table 2).  This result is consistent with those in 
Bzostek, McLanahan, an Carlson (2012), who found that slightly more than half of unwed 
mothers re-partnered within five years of childbirth. For fathers, chances of living with a mother 
of their child decline over time, but the likelihood that they live with a new partner increases by 
five-years after childbirth, then substantially declines by the nine-year survey (see Table 3 and 
Table 4).  
Second, as hypothesized, the results show that having fathers who owe child support 
arrears reduces the likelihood of transition to a residential relationship between biological parents 
who were not living together at the time of childbirth. The findings are consistent with previous 
literature on union formation among parents who had their child outside of wedlock (Carlson et 
al., 2004; Mincy & Dupree, 2001). The results are robust to the inclusion of a rich set of 
covariates. The results also do not seem to be influenced by selection based on differences in 





Lastly, the study provides strong evidence that fathers’ financial burden associated with 
child support arrears are likely to affect fathers’ residential union formation with a new partner, 
even after adjusting for the selection bias introduced by non-random allocation of fathers to the 
treatment group (arrears group). Thus, as reported in the results of the propensity score-based 
analyses in Table 5, fathers who accumulate child support arrears are 1.824 times more likely to 
form a union with a new partner than are those who do not. However, the findings are not 
consistent with those of Bloom et at. (1996), who found no statistically significant relationship 
between low-income nonresident fathers’ child support payments and their likelihood of 
remarriage. The discrepancy between the present study’s findings and those of Bloom et at. 
(1996) may be due to the focused of the latter on child support received by custodial mothers, 
while the former focuses on the existence of child support debt, which appears to have a direct 
impact on the father’s re-partnering. In addition, unlike Bloom et at. (1996), the outcome of the 
present study includes cohabitation, a type of union regarded as less committed than marriage 
unions. Thus, a father may cohabit with a new partner because of his financial difficulties caused 
by an increase in debt burden, but it may be difficult for him to secure a marital partner to.  
The study has several implications for policy makers, researchers, and practitioners. 
Child support debt may have unintended consequences for children by making noncustodial 
fathers marry or cohabit with a new partner. The father may not want to spend more time and 
money on children from a previous relationship after forming a residential union with a new 
partner (Mincy et al., 2014). The situation would be even worse if the father has children with 
the new partner, and that is very likely. Some researchers posit that paternal multiple-partner 
fertility may pose a risk to child outcomes because it hampers fathers from providing adequate 





2017; Meyer, Cancian, & Cook, 2005). Others provide evidence that paternal multiple-partner 
fertility may cause an increase in children’s externalizing behaviors and physical health through 
both paternal depression and father involvement, respectively (Bronte-Tinkew et al., 2009; 
Stewart, Manning, & Smock, 2003). In addition, if the problem of child support debt is not 
resolved, then the relationship between the father and the new partner may deteriorate, resulting 
in poor outcomes for children from the new partner. Therefore, policies designed to help fathers 
manage their child support debt are of importance to both fathers and their children.  
Despite several interesting findings, the study has several potential limitations. First, the 
propensity score methods cannot completely resolve selection bias. Some fathers may be 
selected into the arrears group because of these unobserved factors that can produce bias in the 
estimation of model parameters. One possible example of such an unobserved factor is a sense of 
responsibility required to secure and sustain employment. Fathers who lack this sense of 
responsibility in the workplace will be less likely to have stable employment, and therefore, less 
able to pay off their child support debts. In the relationship market, mothers are less likely to 
accept offers when the potential partner has limited ability to sustain employment (Cigno, 1991; 
Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). Therefore, the causal interpretation would be validated if and only 
if these unobserved factors that affect treatment assignment (arrears group) have no effect on the 
outcome, except through treatment. This is the key assumption of propensity models, often 
referred to as the ignorability assumption. However, this is an untestable assumption.  
Second, the potential measurement errors associated with mothers’ reports of fathers’ 
child support arrears can introduce bias in estimating the effect of arrears on union formation for 
fathers and mothers. For example, as Miller and Mincy (2012) pointed out, mothers may under-





unpaid amount of child support owed to children of different mothers. However, mothers’ 
reports of arrears may be more reliable than fathers’ self-report because fathers tend to under-
report their obligations (Braver, Fitzpatrick, & Bay, 1991). Therefore, the result of this study 







Acs, G., & Nelson, S. (2004). Changes in living arrangements during the late 1990s: Do welfare 
policies matter? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 23(2), 273–290. 
Amato, P. R. (2005). The impact of family formation change on the cognitive, social, and 
emotional well-being of the next generation. The Future of Children, 75–96. 
Amato, P. R., & Maynard, R. A. (2007). Decreasing nonmarital births and strengthening 
marriage to reduce poverty. The Future of Children, 117–141. 
Austin, P. C. (2011). An introduction to propensity score methods for reducing the effects of 
confounding in observational studies. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 46(3), 399–424. 
Becker, G. S. (1973). A theory of marriage: Part I. Journal of Political Economy, 81(4), 813–
846. 
Berger, L. M., Cancian, M., & Meyer, D. R. (2012). Maternal re-partnering and new-partner 
fertility: Associations with nonresident father investments in children. Children and 
Youth Services Review, 34(2), 426–436. 
Bloom, D. E., Conrad, C., & Miller, C. (1996). Child support and fathers’ remarriage and 
fertility. Retrieved from National Bureau of Economic Research website: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5781 
Bramlett, M. D., & Mosher, W. D. (2002). Cohabitation, marriage, divorce, and remarriage in 
the United States. Vital Health Statistics, 23(22), 1–32. 
Braver, S. L., Fitzpatrick, P. J., & Bay, R. C. (1991). Noncustodial parent’s report of child 
support payments. Family Relations, 180–185. 
Bronte-Tinkew, J., Horowitz, A., & Scott, M. E. (2009). Fathering with multiple partners: Links 
to children’s well-being in early childhood. Journal of Marriage and Family, 71(3), 608–
631. 
Brown, S. L. (2010). Marriage and child well-being: Research and policy perspectives. Journal 
of Marriage and Family, 72(5), 1059–1077. 
Buckle, L., Gallup Jr, G. G., & Rodd, Z. A. (1996). Marriage as a reproductive contract: Patterns 
of marriage, divorce, and remarriage. Ethology and Sociobiology, 17(6), 363–377. 
Bumpass, L. (1990). What’s happening to the family? Interactions between demographic and 
institutional change. Demography, 27(4), 483–498. 
Bumpass, L., Sweet, J. A., & Cherlin, A. (1991). The role of cohabitation in declining rates of 





Bumpass, L., Sweet, J., & Martin, T. C. (1990). Changing patterns of remarriage. Journal of 
Marriage and the Family, 747–756. 
Bzostek, S. H., McLanahan, S. S., & Carlson, M. J. (2012). Mothers’ repartnering after a 
nonmarital birth. Social Forces, 90(3), 817–841. 
Cancian, M., & Reed, D. (2008). Family structure, childbearing, and parental employment: 
Implications for the level and trend in poverty. Citeseer. 
Carlson, M. J. (2012). Understanding young fertility in the context of economic disadvantage. In 
Early adulthood in a family context (pp. 221–227). Springer. 
Carlson, M. J., Garfinkel, I., McLanahan, S., Mincy, R., & Primus, W. (2004). The effects of 
welfare and child support policies on union formation. Population Research and Policy 
Review, 23(5–6), 513–542. 
Cherlin, A. (2004). The deinstitutionalization of American marriage. Journal of Marriage and 
Family, 66(4), 848–861. 
Cherlin, A. (2009). Marriage, divorce, remarriage. Harvard University Press. 
Cigno, A. (1991). Economics of the family. 
De Graaf, P. M., & Kalmijn, M. (2003). Alternative routes in the remarriage market: Competing-
risk analyses of union formation after divorce. Social Forces, 81(4), 1459–1498. 
Dush, C. M. K., Kotila, L. E., & Schoppe-Sullivan, S. J. (2011). Predictors of supportive 
coparenting after relationship dissolution among at-risk parents. Journal of Family 
Psychology, 25(3), 356. 
Ellwood, D., & Jencks, C. (2004). The spread of single-parent families in the United States since 
1960. 
Folk, K. F., Graham, J. W., & Beller, A. H. (1992). Child support and remarriage: Implications 
for the economic well-being of children. Journal of Family Issues, 13(2), 142–157. 
Fomby, P., & Osborne, C. (2017). Family instability, multipartner fertility, and behavior in 
middle childhood. Journal of Marriage and Family, 79(1), 75–93. 
Goldscheider, F., & Sassler, S. (2006). Creating stepfamilies: Integrating children into the study 
of union formation. Journal of Marriage and Family, 68(2), 275–291. 
Grossbard-Shechtman, S. (1993). On the economics of marriage: a theory of marriage labor and 
divorce. 
Halpern-Meekin, S., & Turney, K. (2016). Relationship churning and parenting stress among 





Hirano, K., & Imbens, G. W. (2001). Estimation of causal effects using propensity score 
weighting: An application to data on right heart catheterization. Health Services and 
Outcomes Research Methodology, 2(3–4), 259–278. 
Kim, Y., Cancian, M., & Meyer, D. R. (2015). Patterns of child support debt accumulation. 
Children and Youth Services Review, 51, 87–94. 
McLanahan, S. (1995). The consequences of nonmarital childbearing for women, children, and 
society. Introduction Iii Executive Summary: Nonmarital Childbearing in the United 
States v, 229. 
McLanahan, S. (2004). Diverging destinies: How children are faring under the second 
demographic transition. Demography, 41(4), 607–627. 
McLanahan, S., & Sawhill, I. (2015). Marriage and child wellbeing revisited: Introducing the 
issue. The Future of Children, 3–9. 
Meyer, D. R., Cancian, M., & Cook, S. T. (2005). Multiple-partner fertility: Incidence and 
implications for child support policy. Social Service Review, 79(4), 577–601. 
Miller, D. P., & Mincy, R. B. (2012). Falling further behind? Child support arrears and fathers’ 
labor force participation. Social Service Review, 86(4), 604–635. 
Mincy, R. B., & Dupree, A. T. (2001). Welfare, child support and family formation. Children 
and Youth Services Review, 23(6–7), 577–601. 
Mincy, R. B., Jethwani, M., & Klempin, S. (2014). Failing our fathers: Confronting the crisis of 
economically vulnerable nonresident fathers. Oxford University Press. 
Nepomnyaschy, L., & Teitler, J. (2013). Cyclical cohabitation among unmarried parents in 
Fragile Families. Journal of Marriage and Family, 75(5), 1248–1265. 
Oppenheimer, V. K. (1988). A theory of marriage timing. American Journal of Sociology, 94(3), 
563–591. 
Reichman, N. E., Teitler, J. O., Garfinkel, I., & McLanahan, S. S. (2001). Fragile families: 
Sample and design. Children and Youth Services Review, 23(4–5), 303–326. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41–55. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1984). Reducing bias in observational studies using 
subclassification on the propensity score. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
79(387), 516–524. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1985). Constructing a control group using multivariate 
matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score. The American 





Seltzer, J. A. (2000). Families formed outside of marriage. Journal of Marriage and Family, 
62(4), 1247–1268. 
Sorensen, E., Sousa, L., & Schaner, S. (2007). Assessing child support arrears in nine large states 
and the nation. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. Retrieved from 
http://tpcprod.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001242_child_support_arrears.pdf 
Stewart, S. D., Manning, W. D., & Smock, P. J. (2003). Union formation among men in the US: 
Does having prior children matter? Journal of Marriage and Family, 65(1), 90–104. 
Sweeney, M. M. (1997). Remarriage of women and men after divorce: The role of 
socioeconomic prospects. Journal of Family Issues, 18(5), 479–502. 
Turney, K., & Halpern-Meekin, S. (2017). Parenting in On/Off Relationships: The Link Between 
Relationship Churning and Father Involvement. Demography, 1–26. 
Wilcox, W. B. (2015). Testimony before the Subcommittee on Human Resources Committee on 
Ways and Means “Challenges Facing Low-Income Individuals and Families in Today’s 
Economy.” 
Wu, Z., & Schimmele, C. M. (2005). Repartnering after first union disruption. Journal of 
Marriage and Family, 67(1), 27–36. 
Yun, K.-R. (1992). Effects of child support on remarriage of single mothers. An Institute for 
Research on Poverty Study on Child Support Assurance: Design Issues, Expected 









Table 1. Weighted Descriptive Statistics 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Mean SD  Mean SD 
Basic Demographic Characteristics      
   Non-Hispanic White 0.179   0.133  
   Non-Hispanic Black 0.501   0.593  
   Hispanic 0.293   0.221  
   Others 0.027   0.053  
   US Born 0.873   0.883  
   Age at Childbirth 22.422 0.379  25.699 0.849 
   Child is Male 0.525     
   Child is Low Birthweight 0.141     
Economic Characteristics      
   Education at Childbirth      
     Less than high school 0.492   0.450  
     High school graduate 0.341   0.335  
     Some college 0.146   0.272  
     College graduate 0.021   0.033  
   Work Status      
     at Baseline      
        Unemployed 0.154   0.079  
        Part-time 0.371   0.186  
        Full-time 0.475   0.735  
     at 1-year follow-up      
        Unemployed 0.249   0.160  
        Part-time 0.348   0.136  
        Full-time 0.403   0.704  
     at 3-year follow-up      
        Unemployed 0.311   0.120  
        Part-time 0.246   0.126  
        Full-time 0.443   0.754  
     at 5-year follow-up      
        Unemployed 0.319   0.131  
        Part-time 0.202   0.114  
        Full-time 0.479   0.755  
     Income      
        at Baseline 18,693 1,049  27,380 1,834 
        at 1-year follow-up 19,511 1,206  30,859 3,102 
        at 3-year follow-up 21,959 1,874  30,622 2,784 
        at 5-year follow-up 23,677 1,679  38,357 3,428 
   Mothers on welfare      
        at Baseline 0.438     
        at 1-year follow-up 0.522     
        at 3-year follow-up 0.557     






Table 1. (Continued) 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Mean SD  Mean SD 
Behavioral and Health Characteristics      
   Mother reported Father in Jail      
        at baseline    0.050  
        at 1-year follow-up    0.063  
        at 3-year follow-up    0.089  
        at 5-year follow-up    0.085  
   Health Quality (1=Poor, …, 5=Excellent)      
        at baseline 3.844 0.052  3.889 0.079 
        at 1-year follow-up 3.646 0.075  3.914 0.093 
        at 3-year follow-up 3.613 0.073  3.912 0.106 
        at 5-year follow-up 3.497 0.090  3.779 0.133 
Relationship Quality      
   Father-Mother Religious Homogamy 0.364     
   Relationship Duration Before Pregnant in Year 3.337 0.198    
   Whether the Father/Mother Has Children with  
   Someone Other than Child’s Mother/Father 
0.355   0.344  
   Fathers’ Name on the Birth Certificate 0.720     
   Father Asked Mother to Have Abortion 0.204     
      
Unweighted Unique Observations 1,850   1,425  
Unweighted Total Observations      
        at 1-year follow-up 1,669   1,036  
        at 3-year follow-up 1,617   1,027  
        at 5-year follow-up 1,346      883  
        at 9-year follow-up 1,009      687  







Table 2. Life Table Estimates of Cumulative Proportion of New Union Formation 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Proportion  Proportion 




w/ a father 
of child 




w/ a mother 
of child 
w/ a new 
partner 
1 Year 0.898 0.073 0.030  0.871 0.094 0.035 
3 Years 0.745 0.148 0.107  0.694 0.187 0.119 
5 Years 0.555 0.194 0.251  0.482 0.258 0.260 
9 Years 0.314 0.356 0.329  0.302 0.398 0.300 






Table 3. Results from the Discrete-time Multinomial Logit Models Predicting Mothers’ Transition to Cohabitation and Marriage 
Following Child Birth 
 Mother Married to or Cohabitation with 
 a Baby’s Father  a New Partner 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Discrete Time Since Childbirth  (ref=one-year survey)      
   Three-year survey 1.136 1.144 1.136 1.112  1.848*** 1.812*** 1.818*** 1.857*** 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.106) (0.105)  (0.210) (0.211) (0.213) (0.219) 
   Five-year survey 0.947 0.940 0.918 0.893  2.527*** 2.417*** 2.401*** 2.464*** 
 (0.094) (0.096) (0.099) (0.098)  (0.291) (0.285) (0.295) (0.305) 
   Nine-year survey 0.769* 0.735** 0.748* 0.726**  1.412** 1.330* 1.288+ 1.322* 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087)  (0.187) (0.182) (0.178) (0.184) 
Child Support Arrears 0.271*** 0.289*** 0.296*** 0.296***  1.092 1.042 1.038 1.052 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054)  (0.127) (0.124) (0.124) (0.127) 
Basic Demographic Characteristics      
   Race/ethnicity (Ref= White)      
     Black 0.685** 0.774* 0.780* 0.659***  0.727* 0.672** 0.669** 0.688** 
 (0.079) (0.093) (0.095) (0.083)  (0.090) (0.086) (0.086) (0.091) 
     Hispanic 1.208 1.293+ 1.321* 1.187  0.895 0.860 0.855 0.868 
 (0.160) (0.178) (0.184) (0.171)  (0.135) (0.133) (0.134) (0.138) 
     Others 0.473** 0.535* 0.517* 0.453**  0.933 0.929 0.940 0.986 
 (0.136) (0.156) (0.154) (0.137)  (0.244) (0.246) (0.250) (0.265) 
   Mother US born 0.766* 0.770+ 0.775+ 0.705*  1.004 0.997 0.993 1.033 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.107) (0.100)  (0.172) (0.175) (0.176) (0.187) 
   Fathers’ age at BL 0.980* 0.980* 0.979* 0.983  1.000 1.001 1.002 0.995 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
   Mothers’ age at BL 0.997 0.999 1.001 0.999  0.934*** 0.934*** 0.933*** 0.923*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
   Child is Male 0.964 0.970 0.969 0.967  1.021 1.004 0.995 0.982 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072)  (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) 
   Low birthweight 0.986 0.977 0.996 0.994  0.950 0.948 0.944 0.942 






Table 3. (Continued) 
 Mother Married to or Cohabitation with 
 a Baby’s Father  a New Partner 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Economic Characteristics       
   Father’s education at baseline (ref= less than high school)      
     High school grad.  0.884 0.879 0.868   0.758** 0.868 0.772* 
  (0.078) (0.078) (0.077)   (0.076) (0.077) (0.079) 
     Some college  1.051 1.070 1.119   1.056 1.119 1.066 
  (0.127) (0.130) (0.137)   (0.142) (0.137) (0.146) 
     College grad.  0.811 0.820 0.806   0.740 0.806 0.782 
  (0.190) (0.193) (0.196)   (0.218) (0.196) (0.231) 
   Mother’s education at baseline (ref= less than high school)      
     High school grad.  1.025 1.021 1.050   0.996 1.011 1.025 
  (0.092) (0.093) (0.097)   (0.096) (0.098) (0.101) 
     Some college  0.880 0.865 0.886   0.765* 0.775* 0.832 
  (0.098) (0.098) (0.101)   (0.096) (0.097) (0.105) 
     College grad.  0.929 0.903 0.894   0.947 0.963 1.110 
  (0.215) (0.209) (0.209)   (0.285) (0.291) (0.339) 
   Father’s work status (ref=unemployed)      
     Part-time   0.921 0.859 0.832   0.699* 0.729+ 0.739+ 
  (0.158) (0.152) (0.147)   (0.113) (0.121) (0.122) 
     Full-time   1.277+ 1.202 1.158   0.787+ 0.833 0.845 
  (0.175) (0.175) (0.163)   (0.099) (0.104) (0.106) 
   Mother’s work status (ref=unemployed)      
     Part-time   0.820 0.817+ 0.784*   0.989 0.987 1.004 
  (0.101) (0.100) (0.097)   (0.127) (0.128) (0.132) 
     Full-time   0.844 0.825+ 0.791*   1.166 1.143 1.149 






Table 3. (Continued) 
 Mother Married to or Cohabitation with 
 a Baby’s Father  a New Partner 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ln(mother’s Income)  1.189*** 1.193*** 1.184***   0.992 0.997 1.000 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)   (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Ln(father’s Income)  1.086** 1.075* 1.071*   1.000 1.007 1.008 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)   (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
   Mother on welfare  0.941 0.939 0.957   1.356** 1.359** 1.269* 
  (0.076) (0.077) (0.082)   (0.128) (0.129) (0.119) 
Behavioral and Health Characteristics      
   Mother reported  
   father in jail 
  0.654* 0.685*    1.223 1.173 
  (0.112) (0.116)    (0.163) (0.157) 
   father health quality   0.991 0.987    0.915 0.913 
   (0.088) (0.086)    (0.094) (0.094) 
   mother health quality   0.990 0.974    0.950 0.955 
   (0.044) (0.044)    (0.048) (0.048) 
Relationship Characteristics      
   Religion   
   homogeneity 
   1.143     1.041 
   (0.137)     (0.125) 
   Relationship  
   duration before    
   pregnant in year 
   1.006     0.972* 
   
(0.009) 
    
(0.011) 
   Fertility: children with someone other than the focal child’s father(mother)      
     Mother    1.001     1.494*** 
    (0.096)     (0.147) 
     Father    0.835     1.140 







Table 3. (Conrinued) 
 Mother Married to or Cohabitation with 
 a Baby’s Father  a New Partner 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
   Fathers’ name on the  
   birth certificate 
   2.658***     0.738** 
   (0.317)     (0.073) 
          
   Father asked mother  
   to have abortion 
   0.697***     0.888 
   (0.074)     (0.100) 
          
Number of Obs. 5,641 5,641 5,641 5,641  5,641 5,641 5,641 5,641 
Individual Obs 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850  1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850 






Table 4. Results from the Discrete-time Multinomial Logit Models Predicting Fathers’ Transition to Cohabitation and Marriage 
Following Child Birth 
 Father Married to or Cohabitation with 
 a Baby’s Mother  a New Partner 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Discrete Time Since Childbirth  (ref=one-year survey)      
   Three-year survey 1.138 1.143 1.152 1.146  1.642*** 1.737*** 1.759*** 1.774*** 
 (0.118) (0.124) (0.127) (0.127)  (0.221) (0.242) (0.247) (0.251) 
   Five-year survey 0.984 0.983 0.950 0.950  2.019*** 2.124*** 2.163*** 2.202*** 
 (0.112) (0.116) (0.119) (0.119)  (0.278) (0.302) (0.323) (0.330) 
   Nine-year survey 0.618*** 0.587*** 0.580*** 0.587***  0.142*** 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.079)  (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) 
Child Support Arrears 0.244*** 0.268*** 0.278*** 0.279***  1.629*** 1.667*** 1.701*** 1.731*** 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057)  (0.236) (0.248) (0.256) (0.265) 
Basic Demographic Characteristics      
   Race/ethnicity (Ref= White)      
     Black 0.664** 0.743* 0.740* 0.712*  0.683* 0.679* 0.663* 0.643** 
 (0.088) (0.103) (0.105) (0.103)  (0.108) (0.111) (0.110) (0.108) 
     Hispanic 1.500** 1.568** 1.591** 1.512*  0.874 0.841 0.807 0.869 
 (0.230) (0.251) (0.259) (0.249)  (0.174) (0.172) (0.169) (0.184) 
     Others 0.500* 0.525* 0.499* 0.475*  0.738 0.733 0.676 0.730 
 (0.151) (0.160) (0.156) (0.150)  (0.242) (0.243) (0.229) (0.249) 
   Mother US born 0.559*** 0.576*** 0.604** 0.578**  0.710 0.722 0.736 0.704 
 (0.089) (0.095) (0.101) (0.098)  (0.165) (0.172) (0.176) (0.170) 
   Fathers’ age at BL 0.984+ 0.985 0.984 0.987  1.007 1.007 1.009 0.998 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
   Mothers’ age at BL 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.001  0.966* 0.969* 0.968* 0.959** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
   Child is Male 0.956 0.973 0.984 0.975  1.090 1.091 1.126 1.123 
 (0.078) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083)  (0.111) (0.113) (0.118) (0.118) 
   Low birthweight 1.075 1.073 1.096 1.094  1.143 1.164 1.175 1.184 






Table 4. (Continued) 
 Father Married to or Cohabitation with 
 a Baby’s Mother  a New Partner 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Economic Characteristics       
   Father’s education at baseline (ref= less than high school)      
     High school grad.  0.913 0.902 0.906   1.040 1.038 1.067 
  (0.091) (0.091) (0.092)   (0.127) (0.127) (0.133) 
     Some college  1.165 1.176 1.228   1.246 1.206 1.183 
  (0.166) (0.170) (0.179)   (0.210) (0.205) (0.199) 
     College grad.  0.772 0.772 0.805   0.936 0.913 1.013 
  (0.214) (0.214) (0.228)   (0.338) (0.329) (0.379) 
   Mother’s education at baseline (ref= less than high school)      
     High school grad.  1.079 1.081 1.082   0.960 0.955 0.984 
  (0.111) (0.113) (0.114)   (0.120) (0.121) (0.126) 
     Some college  0.896 0.880 0.881   0.790 0.772 0.832 
  (0.115) (0.115) (0.117)   (0.125) (0.124) (0.136) 
     College grad.  0.724 0.696 0.676   0.781 0.749 0.880 
  (0.200) (0.193) (0.189)   (0.275) (0.265) (0.318) 
   Father’s work status (ref=unemployed)      
     Part-time   1.032 0.904 0.907   1.345 1.283 1.278 
  (0.216) (0.189) (0.193)   (0.293) (0.288) (0.284) 
     Full-time   1.520* 1.360+ 1.351+   1.437+ 1.324 1.327 
  (0.260) (0.239) (0.241)   (0.272) (0.256) (0.256) 
   Mother’s work status (ref=unemployed)      
     Part-time   0.769* 0.771+ 0.760*   1.145 1.144 1.161 
  (0.102) (0.103) (0.102)   (0.195) (0.198) (0.203) 
     Full-time   0.818 0.801+ 0.788+   1.251 1.265 1.236 






Table 4. (Continued) 
 Father Married to or Cohabitation with 
 a Baby’s Mother  a New Partner 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ln(mother’s Income)  1.157*** 1.166*** 1.164***   0.991 0.990 0.991 
  (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)   (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
Ln(father’s Income)  1.071* 1.053+ 1.051+   1.025 1.012 1.012 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)   (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
   Mother on welfare  0.938 0.941 0.950   0.966 0.992 0.931 
  (0.086) (0.087) (0.089)   (0.110) (0.115) (0.111) 
Behavioral and Health Characteristics      
   Mother reported  
   father in jail 
  0.457*** 0.473***    0.610* 0.565** 
  (0.092) (0.095)    (0.125) (0.115) 
   Alcohol abuse   0.872 0.877    0.927 0.908 
   (0.089) (0.092)    (0.120) (0.120) 
   father health quality   1.008 1.001    1.047 1.048 
   (0.047) (0.049)    (0.066) (0.067) 
   mother health quality   1.042 1.040    1.033 1.025 
   (0.043) (0.044)    (0.054) (0.053) 
Relationship Characteristics      
   Religion   
   homogeneity 
   1.089     0.822+ 
   (0.116)     (0.096) 
   Relationship  
   duration before    
   pregnant in year 
   1.017     1.012 
   
(0.015) 
    
(0.018) 
   Fertility: children with someone other than the focal child’s father 
(mother) 
     
     Mother    0.998     1.312* 
    (0.099)     (0.173) 
     Father    0.867     1.634** 







Table 4. (Continued) 
 Father Married to or Cohabitation with 
 a Baby’s Mother  a New Partner 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
   Fathers’ name on the  
   birth certificate 
   1.449**     1.011 
   (0.204)     (0.159) 
          
   Father asked mother  
   to have abortion 
   0.761*     1.091 
   (0.093)     (0.154) 
          
Number of Obs. 3,633 3,633 3,633 3,633  3,633 3,633 3,633 3,633 
Individual Obs 1,425 1,425 1,425 1,425  1,425 1,425 1,425 1,425 





Table 5. Results from the Propensity Score-Based Method Predicting Both Parents’ Transition to 
Cohabitation and Marriage After Childbirth 
 
Panel 1: Union Formation of Custodial Mothers after Childbirth 
 PSMa  IPTWb 
 
Mother Married to or 
Cohabitation with 















   Three-year survey 1.117 1.723**  1.014 1.797*** 
 (0.170) (0.296)  (0.782) (0.298) 
   Five-year survey 0.806 2.230***  0.782 2.143*** 
 (0.147) (0.394)  (0.134) (0.369) 
   Nine-year survey 0.767 1.227  0.614** 1.159 
 (0.152) (0.259)  (0.112) (0.240) 
Child Support Arrears 0.274*** 1.026  0.318*** 1.054 
 (0.055) (0.140)  (0.060) (0.136) 
Number of Obs. 5,191  5,641 
Individual Obs 1,713  1,850 
      
Panel 2: Union Formation of Noncustodial Fathers after Childbirth 
 PSMa  IPTWb 
 Father Married to or 
Cohabitation with 
 Father Married to or 
Cohabitation with 












   Three-year survey 1.172 1.906*  0.853 1.740** 
 (0.230) (0.493)  (0.163) (0.366) 
   Five-year survey 0.848 1.821*  0.576* 1.721* 
 (0.193) (0.494)  (0.141) (0.390) 
   Nine-year survey 0.534** 0.099***  0.487** 0.123*** 
 (0.121) (0.050)  (0.110) (0.051) 
Child Support Arrears 0.245*** 1.651*  0.385*** 1.824** 
 (0.057) (0.320)  (0.084) (0.320) 
Number of Obs. 3,179  3,633 
Individual Obs 1,260  1,425 
Note: † p<0.1, *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
PSMa: Propensity score matching with caliper; IPTWb: Inverse probability of 
treatment weight. All confounding covariates used in the regression-based analysis 









Appendix 1. Means of Baseline Demographic Covariates Before and After Matching 
 Unmatched   Matched  
 Arrears No 
Arrears 
Sig  Arrears No Arrears Sig 
Fathers’ Characteristics        
   Non-Hispanic White 0.087 0.070 
* 
 0.083 0.084 
 
   Non-Hispanic Black 0.714 0.689  0.715 0.733 
   Hispanic 0.163 0.213  0.166 0.161 
   Others 0.036 0.028  0.036 0.022 
   Less than high school 0.392 0.356 
* 
 0.376 0.407 
 
   High school graduate 0.403 0.435  0.412 0.402 
   Some college 0.193 0.178  0.199 0.179 
   College graduate 0.013 0.032  0.013 0.012 
   US Born 0.965 0.914 *  0.963 0.964  
   Age at Childbirth 25.631 25.916   25.657 25.899  
Mothers’ Characteristics        
   Non-Hispanic White 0.149 0.102 
* 
 0.138 0.136  
   Non-Hispanic Black 0.693 0.660  0.698 0.702  
   Hispanic 0.142 0.213  0.147 0.144  
   Others 0.015 0.025  0.016 0.018  
   Less than high school 0.312 0.406 
* 
 0.322 0.337  
   High school graduate 0.406 0.338  0.394 0.410  
   Some college 0.260 0.226  0.263 0.235  
   College graduate 0.022 0.030  0.022 0.018  
   US Born 0.988 0.912 *  0.987 0.986  
   Age at Childbirth 23.429 23.649   23.503 23.299  
Child’s Characteristics        
   Child is Male 0.582 0.525 *  0.579 0.569  
   Child is Low Birthweight 0.129 0.125   0.123 0.123  
Note:  *p < .05.  
The study complied with following criteria to achieve close balance: 1) for continuous variable, 
the difference in means must be less or equal to .05 treatment group standard deviations, and the 
ratio of standard deviation for these variables must be between .91 and 1.1, and 2) for each 
categorical variable, the difference in percentages across groups must be less than or equal 









Dissertation Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
 A non-marital birth in the United States has increased in recent decades, and today, 40 
percent of all birth occurs outside of marriage (Bumpass & Lu, 2000; McLanahan & Sawhill, 
2015). Public concerns about the high poverty rates experienced by these children have led 
federal, state, and local governments to strengthen its effort in collecting child support payments 
from noncustodial fathers (Mincy, Jethwani, & Klempin, 2014; Pirog & Ziol-Guest, 2006). 
Despite some encouraging success in meeting its goal, there are still large amounts of unpaid 
child support owed by poor noncustodial fathers who are unable to meet their child support 
obligations (Sorensen, Sousa, & Schaner, 2007). A growing body of research has sought to 
understand factors and outcomes associated with patterns of child support arrears among 
noncustodial fathers (Bartfeld, 2005; Miller & Mincy, 2012; Sorensen et al., 2007; Turner & 
Waller, 2017). The present dissertation is part of such an effort. Together, the chapters in this 
dissertation aimed to explore the role of state-level enforcement effort in predicting the 
accumulation of child support debt, or whether or not such debt would have any effect on 
fathers’ mental health problems or their re-partnering decisions. All chapters used the first five 
waves of data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, a longitudinal birth cohort 
study designed to explore the comprehensive understanding of nonresident parent.  
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS  
Chapter 1 investigated the extent to which child support policies affect noncustodial 
fathers’ long-term patterns of arrears accumulation. To avoid potential biases stemming from the 
censored observations, a Tobit model was implemented. Results from this work indicate that the 
association between a number of years since the order was established and the accumulation of 





enforcement. The results also show that more efficient child support enforcement brought fewer 
arrears burden to fathers who lived with their child at birth than those who did not.  
Chapter 2 explored the detrimental consequences of child support arrears: fathers’ mental 
health problems. The main objective of this chapter is to test whether nonresident fathers who 
owe child support arrears are at risk for the development of depression and alcohol abuse 
problems. To attenuate a potential omitted variable bias, fathers’ previous mental health status 
was included as a covariate. As a robustness check, I used an instrumental variable approach to 
correct for endogeneity and measurement error associated with mothers’ report of fathers’ child 
support arrears. The results of this analysis provide strong evidence that fathers who owed 
arrears were more likely to report mental health problems than those who did not owe any 
arrears. The results also showed that fathers who received more support from friends and 
families during childbirth were less likely to develop depression caused by child support arrears 
than those who received less support. The results were robust to the inclusion of a rich set of 
covariates and a lagged dependent variable.  
Chapter 3 investigated whether fathers’ arrears accumulation affected the transition to a 
new union formation among couples who were not living together at the time of childbirth. The 
event-history analysis was conducted using a discrete-time competing risks hazard model in 
which the transition to either marriage or cohabitation and remain single are treated as competing 
events. As a robustness check, I employed propensity-score matching methods to reduce some of 
the bias arising from the confounding variables. The results showed that having fathers who owe 
child support arrears reduced the likelihood of transition to a committed relationship between 
biological parents who were not living together at the time of childbirth. However, the arrears 





strong evidence that fathers’ financial burden associated with child support arrears were likely to 
affect fathers’ decision to form a stable union with a new partner, even after adjusting for the 
selection bias introduced by non-random allocation of fathers to the treatment group (arrears 
group).  
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH 
The findings from each chapter contribute to the literature on child support and low-
income noncustodial fathers in a number of ways. First, results from Chapter 1 indicate that 
efficient child support enforcement would lead to a faster reduction of arrears, which is of greater 
benefit to children who lived with their father at birth. Therefore, the results can be used to 
inform policymakers and researchers who have sought to find various strategies to encourage 
fathers to attend the birth of their child.  
Second, findings from Chapter 2 contribute to the prior literature by extending the stress 
process theory in the context of child support enforcement policy. Using nationally 
representative data on nonresident fathers, this work provides the first evidence on whether 
nonresident fathers who owe child support debt are at risk for the development of mental health 
problems. In addition, results from Chapter 2 support the idea that social support may protect 
fathers with high arrears burden from the negative consequences of stress exposure. The findings 
suggest that policies that promote social support and mental health in the child support system 
can break the vicious cycle of fathers’ repeated failures of complying with their child support 
orders.  
Third, results from Chapter 3 contribute to the literature on re-partnering patterns of 
unmarried couples in the United States. The findings add to the evidence that a decrease in 





stable relationship with a new partner. This finding contradicts to the previous study showing 
that lower disposable income will make the father a less attractive partner for women in the 
relationship market (Bloom, Conrad, & Miller, 1996).   
In addition, if the father has children with a new partner (which is very likely), he may 
not be able to provide adequate resources to his children from both previous and current 
relationships. This should give lawmakers an incentive to adopt policies that limit the growth of 
arrears (e.g., charging interest and penalties on unpaid child support, making it easier for low-
income noncustodial fathers to downward modify child support orders, and forgiveness of 
arrears program, etc.).  
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 A growing number of scholars have recognized the problems associated with child 
support debt among noncustodial fathers, but there is still limited knowledge of how arrears are 
accumulated or eliminated over time. As pointed out by Kim et al. (2015), there is still much to 
understand about preventive factors that we can learn from the fathers who have succeeded in 
paying off their arrears. Therefore, future research is needed to identify the characteristics of 
these fathers.  
 Future research should also explore whether our results are driven by measurement errors 
in the child support arrears variable. Because the study relies on mothers’ reports of fathers’ 
child support arrears, the results of the chapter using arrears as a key independent variable could 
be biased. Although I used the instrumental variable approach to address concerns about 
measurement error, it is not a panacea because the method could not address the missing 





Therefore, the result of this study should be replicated in future research with new data that are 
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